Corpus Linguistics and the Dream of Objectivity by Zoldan, Evan C.
ZOLDAN (DO NOT DELETE) 11/15/2019 6:03 PM 
 
401 
Corpus Linguistics and the Dream of Objectivity 
Evan C. Zoldan* 
A growing number of scholars and judges have embraced corpus 
linguistics as a way to interpret legal texts.  Their stated goal—to make 
legal interpretation more objective—is an admirable one.  But, is their 
claim that corpus linguistics reduces the subjectivity associated with 
judicial intuition and biased data more than just a dream?  After analyzing 
the way that corpus linguistics is used to interpret statutes, this Article 
concludes that corpus linguistics does not live up to its promise to make 
legal interpretation more objective.  Instead, the use of corpus linguistics to 
interpret statutes results in interpretations that are radically acontextual, 
disrupting its proponents’ dream of objectivity. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The notion of objectivity in legal interpretation carries great rhetorical 
force.  It evokes a world in which judges are neutral, dispassionate, and all 
but invisible in the contests they judge.1  In a well-known statement made 
during his Senate confirmation hearing, then-Judge John Roberts invoked 
this vision of objectivity when he declared that “Judges are like umpires.  
Umpires don’t make the rules, they apply them . . . .  [A]nd I will 
remember that it’s my job to call balls and strikes, and not to pitch or bat.”2  
Not all legal thinkers express such optimism about the prospect that a legal 
interpreter can remain separated from an interpretation.  More modestly, 
 
 1  See Charles Fried, Balls and Strikes, 61 EMORY L.J. 641 (2012).  
 2  Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief Justice 
of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 55–56 
(2005) (statement of John G. Roberts).  
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Professor Kent Greenawalt suggests, it is inevitable that the interpreter’s 
perspective will be incorporated into an interpretation; nevertheless, a 
community’s shared language and culture means that “questions about 
meaning can often be answered with confidence, that an answer can be 
objectively right or wrong.”3  For Professor Owen Fiss, objectivity 
connotes standards, implying that “an interpretation can be measured 
against a set of norms that transcend the particular vantage point of the 
person offering the interpretation.”4 
These visions of objectivity differ; but in each one, interpretive 
objectivity means not merely signposts for legal interpreters, but also 
fences to corral their interpretations.  It is the desire to constrain the 
interpreter that is the dream of objectivity: an objective interpretation 
reduces the role of the legal interpreter in the interpretive process by 
limiting the range of permissible interpretations.5 
It is with this dream of objectivity that some legal interpreters have 
embraced corpus linguistics methods to interpret legal texts.  Corpus 
linguistics, a methodology or set of tools for studying language data in 
bodies of text,6 is not a new discipline.  What is new is the use of corpus 
linguistics to interpret legal texts, like statutes and the Constitution.  
Asserting that statutory interpretation often calls on the interpreter to find 
the “ordinary meaning” of a text, users of corpus linguistics methods seek 
meaning in bodies of text, called corpora, that they claim reflect the 
ordinary usage of those words.  Although some corpus users acknowledge 
the role that the interpreter’s judgment plays in interpretation, the dream of 
objectivity is the rallying cry of corpus linguistics for legal interpretation.  
Indeed, corpus users frame the utility of corpus linguistics techniques in 
terms of a critique of other methods of interpretation, which are often 
derided as “simple cherry-picking,”7 “subjective,”8 or “idiosyncratic.”9  In 
 
 3  KENT GREENAWALT, LAW AND OBJECTIVITY 74 (1992).  
 4  Owen Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REV. 739, 744–45 (1982).  
See also RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE viiix (1986) (insisting that “in most hard cases 
there are right answers,” even if those right answers cannot be proved to be correct); id. at 
255–56 (arguing that a community’s history and political principles are objective facts that 
provide outer bounds on the subjectivity of legal interpretation); Ronald Dworkin, No Right 
Answer?, 53 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 30–31 (1978).  
 5  Ofer Raban, Between Formalism and Conservatism: The Resurgent Legal 
Formalism of the Roberts Court, 8 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 343, 368 (2014).  
 6  GRAEME KENNEDY, AN INTRODUCTION TO CORPUS LINGUISTICS 1 (2014).  Krzysztof 
Kredens & Malcolm Coulthard, Corpus Linguistics in Authorship Identification, in THE 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LANGUAGE AND LAW 504–05 (Peter M. Tiersma & Lawrence M. 
Solan eds., 2016) (noting different definitions of “corpus” and “corpus linguistics”).  
 7  Thomas R. Lee & Stephen C. Mouritsen, Judging Ordinary Meaning, 127 YALE L.J. 
807 (2018). 
 8  James C. Phillips, Daniel M. Ortner & Thomas R. Lee, Corpus Linguistics & 
Original Public Meaning: A New Tool to Make Originalism More Empirical, 126 Yale 
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contrast, some corpus users claim that corpus linguistics can “help us 
deliver on the promise of an objective inquiry.”10 
Corpus users’ criticisms of other methods of interpretation have been 
persuasive to a small but growing group of judges who have adopted, to 
various degrees, corpus linguistics methods in their opinions.  These 
methods have been used most consistently, and explained most thoroughly, 
by the Supreme Court of Utah’s Justice Lee, an early judicial adopter of 
corpus methods.11  In the first adoption by a state high court, the Supreme 
Court of Michigan relied explicitly on corpus linguistics methods to 
interpret a state statute.12  Importantly, corpus linguistics methods have 
spread from state courts to federal courts.  A federal district court relied in 
part on corpus methods when interpreting a term of the Federal Credit 
Union Act, using data from a corpus search alongside a Westlaw search, 
dictionaries, and canons of construction.13  In a pair of Court of Appeals 
opinions interpreting provisions of ERISA, judges of the Third Circuit14 
and the Sixth Circuit15 have relied on corpus data as well.  And most 
notably, Justice Thomas cited data returned by a corpus search in his 
dissent in Carpenter v. United States.16  So, too, has the scholarly 
community begun to take notice.  Building on the recent burst of judicial 
uses of corpus linguistics, legal scholarship has begun working out the 
possibilities of this new methodology.17  All of this suggests that corpus 
 
L.J.F. 21, 23–24 (2016) (arguing that corpus linguistics sometimes can “rescue” originalism 
from subjectivity).  See also Stephen C. Mouritsen, Hard Cases and Hard Data, 13 COLUM. 
SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 156, 202 (2011) (“Thus, the corpus method embodies the 
lexicographer’s proud ideal of descriptive objectivity; his citations (and interpretations of 
them) are publicly verifiable.”) (internal citations omitted). 
 9  Stefan Th. Gries & Brian G. Slocum, Ordinary Meaning and Corpus Linguistics, 
2017 BYU L. REV. 1417, 1441 (2017). 
 10  Lee & Mouritsen, supra note 7, at 796. 
 11  State v. Rasabout, 356 P.3d 1258, 1274 (Utah 2015) (Lee, J., concurring); In re 
Adoption of Baby E.Z., 266 P.3d 702, 72527 (Utah 2011) (Lee, J., concurring). 
 12  People v. Harris, 885 N.W.2d 832, 838–39 (Mich. 2016). 
 13  Am. Bankers Ass’n v. Nat’l Credit Union Admin., 306 F. Supp. 3d 44, 68 (D.D.C. 
2018). 
 14  Caesars Entm’t Corp. v. Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs, 932 F.3d 91, 95 (3d Cir. 
2019). 
 15  Wilson v. Safelite Grp., Inc., 930 F.3d 429, 439, 440 (6th Cir. 2019) (Thapar, J., 
concurring). 
 16  Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2238 (2018) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 17  E.g., Anya Bernstein, Democratizing Interpretation, 60 WM. & MARY L. REV. 435 
(2018); Clark D. Cunningham & Jesse Egbert, Scientific Methods for Analyzing Original 
Meaning: Corpus Linguistics and the Emoluments Clause (Ga. St. Univ. Coll. Law, Legal 
Studies Research Paper No. 2019-02, 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstra 
ct id=3321438; J.S. Ehrett, Against Corpus Linguistics, 108 GEO. L. J. ONLINE (2019); Gries 
& Slocum, supra note 9, at 1434; Ethan Herenstein, The Faulty Frequency Hypothesis, 70 
STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 112, 116-119 (2017); Carissa Byrne Hessick, Corpus Linguistics and 
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linguistics methods are increasingly relevant to interpretive theory.  As a 
result, the time has come to examine whether corpus linguistics can deliver 
on its promise of interpretive constraints. 
After examining the theory and practice of corpus use for the purposes 
of statutory interpretation, this Article concludes that, despite its allure, 
corpus linguistics does not bring legal interpretation closer to fulfilling the 
dream of objectivity.  Part II introduces the discipline of corpus linguistics 
and describes how it is used by legal scholars and judges to interpret 
statutes.  Part III sets out the case for objectivity made by proponents of 
corpus linguistics for statutory interpretation.  It first describes corpus 
users’ criticisms of the subjectivity of other methods of interpretation, 
specifically, the subjectivity that flows from the interpreter’s reliance on 
her own intuition and on biased data.  Next, it describes the ways in which 
some corpus users believe that corpus linguistics techniques reduce the 
subjectivity associated with intuition and biased data. 
Part IV analyzes corpus linguistics methods to determine whether they 
do, in fact, reduce the subjectivity of the interpretive process.  Despite the 
claims of its proponents, corpus users introduce subjectivity into the 
interpretive process at the moment they choose a corpus to search.  This 
subjective decision determines the final interpretive outcome, disrupting 
corpus users’ dream of objectivity.  Part V compares the subjectivity of 
corpus linguistics methods to the subjectivity corpus users criticize in other 
methods of interpretation.  Strikingly, the subjectivity of corpus use rests 
also on the interpreter’s intuition and on biased data, undermining the claim 
that corpus linguistics is superior to other methods of interpretation. 
This Article makes three main contributions to the literature on corpus 
linguistics and legal interpretation.  First, this Article contests the central 
claim made by users of corpus linguistics for statutory interpretation, 
 
the Criminal Law, 2017 BYU L. REV. 1503, 1508–09 (2017); Jennifer L. Mascott, The 
Dictionary as a Specialized Corpus, 2017 BYU L. REV. 1557 (2017) [hereinafter Mascott, 
Dictionary]; Jennifer L. Mascott, Who Are Officers of the United States?, 70 STAN. L. REV. 
443, 496 (2018) [hereinafter Mascott, Officers]; Phillips et al., supra note 8, at 24–26; James 
Cleith Phillips & Sara White, The Meaning of the Three Emoluments Clauses in the U.S. 
Constitution, 59 S. TEX. L. REV. 181 (2019); Brian G. Slocum, Ordinary Meaning and 
Empiricism, 40 STAT. L. Rev. 13 (2019); Lawrence M. Solan, Legal Linguistics in the U.S.: 
Looking Back, Looking Ahead (Brook. L. Sch., Legal Studies Paper No. 609, 2019), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers/cfm?abstract_id=3428489; Lawrence M. Solan & 
Tammy Gales, Corpus Linguistics as a Tool in Legal Interpretation, 2017 BYU L. REV. 
1311, 1332; Lawrence B. Solum, Intellectual History as Constitutional Theory, 101 VA. L. 
REV. 1111, 1135–36 (2015) (arguing that corpus linguistics is appropriate for the 
investigation of semantic meaning of constitutional text because the Constitution, for 
historical reasons, is “directed to the public at large”); Lee J. Strang, How Big Data 
Increases Originalism’s Methodological Rigor: Using Corpus Linguistics to Recover 
Original Language Conventions, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1181 (2017) (suggesting extra-
textual analysis to determine parameters of corpus search).  
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namely, that it constrains legal interpretation in a way that reduces 
subjectivity in the interpretive process.  By focusing on the subjective 
choice of corpus that users of corpus methods must make, this Article 
concludes that corpus use is no more objective than the methods of 
interpretation criticized by corpus users themselves. 
Second, previous work on corpus linguistics methods generally do not 
distinguish between the use of these methods for statutory interpretation 
and their use in constitutional interpretation.  This Article focuses on 
statutory interpretation alone, analyzing corpus methods in light of the 
legislative process and the unique nature of statutory language.  In 
particular, this Article describes the significant differences between 
statutory language and nonlegal language.  It concludes that searching for 
legal meaning in a corpus of nonlegal language is particularly inappropriate 
for statutory interpretation.  Rather than simply serving as another “tool in 
the toolbox” of statutory interpretation, corpus linguistics is different from 
traditional tools of statutory interpretation because it leads to interpretations 
that are radically acontextual.18 
Third, previous work on corpus linguistics and interpretation has 
suggested that the construction of a legal corpus might cure the defects that 
flow from the mismatch between statutory language and nonlegal texts.  
 
 18  This Article does not address the use of corpus linguistics techniques in general, nor 
does it suggest that corpus linguistics techniques are inappropriate in disciplines outside of 
the context of statutory interpretation.  Moreover, this Article does not address the use of 
corpus linguistics for constitutional interpretation. Nevertheless, much of the work here 
might be applicable to the question of constitutional interpretation as well.  McGinnis and 
Rappaport have argued that the Constitution is written in legal language, much as I argue 
here that statutes are written in legal language.  John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, 
The Constitution and the Language of the Law, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1321 (2018).  By 
contrast, other scholars have suggested that at least some constitutional terms are written in 
ordinary language.  Solum, supra note 17, at 1136.  In her work interpreting the term 
“Officers of the United States,” for example, Jennifer Mascott defended the decision to 
search for the term “officer” as an ordinary term after first conducting an extensive extra-
textual analysis to determine whether the constitutional term was an ordinary term rather 
than a term of art.  Mascott, Officers, supra note 17, at 471–72.  Mascott looked not only to 
other clauses of the Constitution, but also to the Constitution’s drafting history, founding-era 
debates, and preratification history.  Mascott, Officers, supra note 17, at 471–79.  Mascott’s 
process follows the elaborate approach set out by Lee Strang, who suggested that corpus 
research should normally be done only after parameters for the search are established 
through the study of sources external to the text under consideration.  Strang, supra note 17, 
at 1208–09.  Strang suggests, for example, that a “stable of possible language conventions” 
can be gathered by searching case law, scholarship, and primary and secondary sources.  
Strang, supra note 17, at 1207.  See also John Mikhail, The Definition of Emolument in 
English Language and Legal Dictionaries, 1523–1806 (forthcoming) (on file with 
Georgetown Univ. Law Center).  I take no position at this time whether any part of the 
Constitution can be interpreted as if it were ordinary language.  But, to the extent that 
constitutional language is legal language, the arguments made in this Article also suggest 
the inappropriateness of searching in a corpus of nonlegal language for constitutional 
meaning. 
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This Article anticipates different types of legal corpora that might be 
constructed and demonstrates practical and theoretical difficulties that 
make  the objective use of a legal corpus for statutory interpretation 
unlikely. 
II. CORPUS LINGUISTICS AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 
Corpus linguistics is a methodology or set of tools for studying 
language data in bodies of text.19  Although the study of linguistic 
information found in collections of text is not a new activity,20 corpus 
linguistics has taken on new importance as electronic storage and retrieval 
systems allow users to search bodies of text, or corpora, that cannot 
feasibly be searched manually.21  This wealth of electronic data has opened 
up new possibilities for researchers to find evidence of patterns of language 
use.22  Corpus linguistics techniques are often used to determine how 
frequently words are used, in what context they are used, and, when a word 
has multiple shades of meaning, or senses, what other words tend to 
collocate with each of a word’s senses.23  The word “deal,” for example, 
has multiple senses, including to solve a problem (“deal with the 
situation”), to cope (“deal with the tragedy”), and to engage in business 
interactions (“deal with the supplier”).24  Analyzing how “deal” collocates 
with the words around it can help an interpreter determine which sense of 
deal is meant in a particular text.25 
Corpus linguistics methods have proved enticing to legal interpreters, 
some of whom have touted the ability of corpus analysis to minimize 
subjectivity in textual interpretation.26  A growing number of scholars and 
 
 19  KENNEDY, supra note 6, at 1; Kredens & Coulthard, supra note 6, at 504–05 (noting 
competing and overlapping definitions of corpus linguistics); TONY MCENERY & ANDREW 
HARDIE, CORPUS LINGUISTICS: METHOD, THEORY, AND PRACTICE 1–2 (2012) (noting that 
corpus linguistics is still a rapidly developing field and that, as a result, its methods and 
definitions are contested).  
 20  KENNEDY, supra note 6, at 1; DOUGLAS BIBER ET AL., CORPUS LINGUISTICS: 
INVESTIGATING LANGUAGE STRUCTURE AND USE 21–22 (1998). 
 21  BIBER ET AL., supra note 20, at 22–23; KENNEDY, supra note 6, at 1; Peter M. 
Tiersma & Lawrence M. Solan, Introduction in HANDBOOK OF LANGUAGE AND LAW 3 
(2012). 
 22  BIBER ET AL., supra note 20, at 1–2. 
 23  Id. at at 23–25. 
 24  Id. at 42. 
 25  Id. at 42–43.  Importantly, however, linguists recognize that there is not a perfect 
correlation between collocation and usage of a word.  Rather, a “single collocation can be 
used with a range of senses.”  BIBER ET AL., supra note 20, at 43.  See also George Miller, 
Contextuality, in MENTAL MODELS IN COGNITIVE SCIENCE 2–3 (1996) (discussing 
polysemy).  
 26  State v. Rasabout, 356 P.3d 1258, 127475 (Utah 2015) (Lee, J., concurring) 
(arguing that corpus linguistics is intended to ameliorate judicial intuition); Utah v. J.M.S., 
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judges have turned to corpus linguistics techniques when searching for the 
original public meaning of the text of the Constitution27 or the ordinary 
meaning of statutes.28  Although there are a number of corpora with 
different sets of texts, users of corpus linguistics methods for statutory 
interpretation rely exclusively, or virtually so, on general corpora, that is, 
corpora that contain a balance of different types of texts that are meant to 
approximate ordinary speech.29  For example, the Corpus of Contemporary 
American English (COCA) contains more than 560 million words that 
come from a variety of sources, including transcriptions of spoken 
language, fiction, popular magazines, newspaper articles, and academic 
works.30 
A recent case from the Supreme Court of Michigan is typical of the 
way legal interpreters have relied on corpus linguistics techniques.  In 
Harris, a statute prohibited the state from using a law enforcement officer’s 
disclosure of “any information” in a subsequent criminal proceeding 
against the officer.31  Three officers made false statements in the course of 
an internal investigation into their conduct.  The state used these false 
statements in a criminal proceeding against the officers on the theory that 
“information” pertains only to accurate statements and, as a result, false 
statements do not fall within the ambit of the statute.32  The court rejected 
this argument, relying, in part, on data derived from the COCA.  
 
280 P.3d 410, 419 n.3 (Utah 2011) (Lee, J., concurring) (arguing that corpus linguistics is 
used to check imperfect judicial intuition); Mouritsen, supra note 8, at 175–78 (arguing that 
judges tend to be idiosyncratic in their intuition about ordinary usage and therefore cannot 
determine ordinary usage intuitively); D. Carolina Nuñez, War of the Words: Aliens, 
Immigrants, Citizens, and the Language of Exclusion, 2014 BYU L. REV. 1517, 1521 
(arguing that corpus linguistics is a more reliable guide to language use than native speaker 
intuition); Phillips & White, supra note 17, at 18283. 
 27  Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2238 (Thomas, J., dissenting); Mascott, 
Dictionary, supra note 17, at 1557; Mascott, Officers, supra note 17, at 496; Phillips, Ortner 
& Lee, supra note 8, at 24–26; Phillips & White, supra note 17, at 183; Strang, supra note 
17, at 1181. 
 28  Caesars Entm’t Corp. v. Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs, 932 F.3d 91, 95 (3d Cir. 
2019); Wilson v. Safelite Grp., Inc., 930 F.3d 429, 440 (6th Cir. 2019) (Thapar, J., 
concurring); Am. Bankers Ass’n v. Nat’l Credit Union Admin., 306 F. Supp. 3d 44, 68 
(D.D.C. 2018); People v. Harris, 885 N.W.2d 832 (Mich. 2016); Rasabout, 356 P.3d at 1274 
(Lee, J., concurring); In re: Adoption of Baby E.Z., 266 P.3d 702, 724 n.23 (Utah 2011) 
(Lee, J., concurring); Stephen Mouritsen, The Dictionary Is Not a Fortress, 2010 BYU L. 
REV. 1915, 1956–57 (2010); Daniel Ortner, The Merciful Corpus: The Rule of Lenity, 
Ambiguity, and Corpus Linguistics, 25 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 101, 123 (2016). 
 29  See e.g., Craig v. Provo City, 389 P.3d 423, 428 n.3 (Utah 2016); Baby E.Z., 266 
P.3d at 724 n.23 (Lee, J. concurring in part); Mouritsen, supra note 28, at 1956; Ortner, 
supra note 28, at 128–29.  
 30  CORPUS CONTEMPORARY AM. ENG., https://www.english-corpora.org/coca/ (last 
visited Sept. 21, 2019). 
 31  Harris, 885 N.W.2d at 833.  
 32  Id. at 835. 
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Examining the COCA to determine whether the word “information” is 
commonly collocated with words denoting truth or falsity, the court found 
that the word information is often used in close proximity with words that 
denote both truth and falsity, like “accurate,” and “inaccurate.”33  The court 
concluded that the ordinary meaning of information, as used in the statute, 
includes both true and false information.34  As a result, the court interpreted 
the statute to prohibit the use of even false statements against the officers. 
III. CORPUS LINGUISTICS AND THE DREAM OF OBJECTIVITY 
Although many users of corpus linguistics acknowledge that the 
elimination of the judge from the interpretive process is impossible,35 its 
strongest proponents see corpus linguistics as a way to help achieve the 
dream of objectivity.  Indeed, most often, they frame the utility of corpus 
linguistics techniques in terms of a critique of other methods of 
interpretation, which are often derided as “simple cherry-picking,” 36 
“subjective,”37 or “idiosyncratic.”38  By contrast, corpus users have argued, 
corpus linguistics techniques can “help us deliver on the promise of an 
objective inquiry”39 by reducing the subjectivity that plagues the process of 
legal interpretation.40  Corpus users’ criticisms of other methods of 
statutory interpretation fall roughly into one of two categories.  Some 
interpretations, they argue, rely on the intuition of the interpreter rather 
than data of language use.41  Other interpretations, they claim, rely on 
sources of language data that are biased and, as a result, fail to reflect 
 
 33  Id. at 839.  
 34  Id.  See also id. at 839 n.33.  In a revealing passage, the dissent demonstrated that the 
methodology employed by the court could support the opposite inference about the meaning 
of “information.”  Id. at 850 n.14 (Markman, J., dissenting in part).  
 35  See Gries & Slocum, supra note 9, at 1447; Mouritsen, supra note 8, at 203. 
 36  Lee & Mouritsen, supra note 7, at 807. 
 37  Phillips, Ortner & Lee, supra note 8, at 23–24 (arguing that corpus linguistics 
sometimes can “rescue” originalism from subjectivity).  See also Mouritsen, supra note 8, at 
202 (“Thus, the corpus method embodies the lexicographer’s proud ideal of descriptive 
objectivity; his citations (and interpretations of them) are publicly verifiable.”) (internal 
citations omitted). 
 38  Gries & Slocum, supra note 9, at 1441. 
 39  Lee & Mouritsen, supra note 7, at 796. 
 40  See generally State v. Rasabout, 356 P.3d 1258, 1274 (Utah 2015) (Lee, J., 
concurring); State v. J.M.S., 280 P.3d 410, 419 n.3 (Utah 2011); In re Adoption of Baby 
E.Z., 266 P.3d 702, 728 (Utah 2011) (Lee, J., concurring); Gries & Slocum, supra note 9, at 
1441; Lee & Mouritsen, supra note 7, at 867; Mouritsen, supra note 8, at 175–78, 180; 
Nuñez, supra note 26, at 1521; Phillips & White, supra note 17, at 187. 
 41  Rasabout, 356 P.3d at 1274 (Lee, J., concurring); J.M.S., 280 P.3d at 419 n.3; Gries 
& Slocum, supra note 9, at 1441; Lee & Mouritsen, supra note 7, at 806; Mouritsen, supra 
note 8, at 175–78; Nuñez, supra note 26, at 1521. 
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actual language use.42  This Part identifies the two categories of subjectivity 
criticized by corpus users and describes the ways in which corpus users 
believe that corpus linguistics techniques reduce subjectivity. 
Evaluating the claim that corpus techniques can reduce subjectivity 
and help achieve objectivity is complicated by two facts.  First, although 
they use the language of “objectivity” and “subjectivity,” proponents of 
corpus linguistics methods for statutory interpretation have so far declined 
to define these terms consistently.  Second, objectivity and subjectivity 
have a number of different definitions.  Without denying the diversity of 
views on the topic, for the purposes of this Article, an interpretation is 
objective if the mechanisms for arriving at it are free of bias and other 
distorting factors that obscure the interpretation.43  As a corollary, an 
interpretation is objective if the process for reaching it is “reliably 
constrained by effective rules, procedures, or goals.”44  Conversely, an 
interpretation is subjective if it is not objective; that is, if bias or other 
distorting factors obscure the interpretation or if the interpretation is 
unconstrained by effective rules, procedures, or goals.  Although there are 
other ways to define these terms, I use these definitions because they 
capture neatly both corpus users’ criticisms of other methods of 
interpretation and their claim that corpus linguistics is a superior method of 
interpretation.  Using these definitions, criticism by corpus users of 
interpretations that rely on the interpreter’s intuition or biased data can be 
framed as a critique of the subjectivity of these methods compared with the 
relative objectivity of corpus methods.  These definitions also capture the 
criticisms of corpus linguistics methods that I raise in Part V, below. 
 
 
 42  Craig v. Provo City, 389 P.3d, 423, 428 n.3 (Utah 2016); Baby E.Z., 266 P.3d at 728 
(Lee, J., concurring); Ellen P. Aprill, The Law of the Word: Dictionary Shopping in the 
Supreme Court, 30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 275, 297 (1998); James J. Brudney, Faithful Agency 
Versus Ordinary Meaning Advocacy, 57 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 975, 981 (2013); Mouritsen, 
supra note 28, at 1921; Lawrence M. Solan, Can Corpus Linguistics Help Make Originalism 
Scientific, 127 YALE L.J.F. 57, 59 (2016). 
 43  Objective, THE SAGE DICTIONARY OF SOCIOLOGY (1984) (“[W]e are being objective 
when we see things accurately, without our perception being distorted by our preferences, 
biases, and prejudices.”); Fiss, supra note 4, at 744–45 (“[A]n interpretation can be 
measured against a set of norms that transcend the particular vantage point of the person 
offering the interpretation.”).  See William Eskridge, The New Textualism and Normative 
Canons, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 531, 576 (2013) (a canon is objective if it “impels judges to 
read statutes without regard to their own political preferences”).  See also WILLARD QUINE, 
WORD AND OBJECT 7–8 (1960). 
 44  Frank Lovett, What Counts as Arbitrary Power?, 5 J. POL. POWer 137, 139 (2012) 
(defining arbitrary power).  Cf. DOUGLAS E. EDLIN, COMMON LAW JUDGING 59 (2016) (“the 
opposite of validity is arbitrariness”).  
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A. Intuition and Statutory Interpretation 
The resort to intuition in statutory interpretation is neither new nor 
particularly controversial.  As a number of commentators have noted, a 
native speaker’s intuitive understanding of the meaning of a word is, in an 
important sense, its ordinary meaning.45  In ordinary speech, speakers do 
not refer to “definitions, rules, or reasons” governing language use.  Rather, 
speakers “simply use words,” which are understood “because use and 
meaning are constituted by the life and practices of a community.”46  In this 
view, interpretation should largely be a non-technical exercise: a 
“competent user of ordinary language” normally should be able to 
determine a word’s meaning.47  This view of interpretation is supported by 
an important strain of linguistic theory.  Noam Chomsky explains that 
native speakers of a language know (or perhaps better, “cognize”48) 
whether language use is ordinary or atypical, grammatical or 
ungrammatical.49  In line with this view, it is common for judges to 
interpret statutes based on their intuitive understanding of the meaning of 
statutory text.50 
This optimistic view of intuition, and the judicial practice that flows 
from it, has been criticized by corpus users,51 among many others.52  
 
 45  Robert Summers, The Argument from Ordinary Meaning in Statutory Interpretation, 
in ESSAYS IN LEGAL THEORY 216 (2000); Gries & Slocum, supra note 9, at 1434; Lawrence 
M. Solan, The New Textualists New Text, 38 LOY. U. L.A. L. REV. 2027, 2053–54 (2005) 
(“simple introspection is generally adequate to discover” the “most ordinary sense” of 
statutory language); Solan & Gales, supra note 17, at 1332. 
 46  Paul E. McGreal, Slighting Context: On the Illogic of Ordinary Speech in Statutory 
Interpretation, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 325, 334 (2004). 
 47  Summers, supra note 45, at 228.  
 48  NOAM CHOMSKY, RULES AND REPRESENTATIONS 70 (1980). 
 49  See NOAM CHOMSKY, LANGUAGE AND THE PROBLEMS OF KNOWLEDGE 3 (1988); 
Alani Golanski, Linguistics in Law, 66 ALB. L. REV. 61 (2002); Lawrence M. Solan, Can the 
Legal System Use Experts on Meaning, 66 TENN. L. REV. 1167, 1181 (1999). 
 50  Indeed, Justice Lee, a principal judicial proponent of corpus linguistics for 
interpretive purposes, acknowledges as much.  State v. Rasabout, 356 P.3d 1258, 1274 
(Utah 2015) (Lee, J., concurring) (“That leaves a third explanation for the majority’s 
conclusion: The court’s sense of discharge as shoot may simply be an expression of the 
majority’s linguistic intuition.”).  See RICHARD POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 
72–73 (1990) (noting that practical reason, including intuition, is our “principal set of tools 
for answering questions large and small”); id. at 124–25 (“Intuition, itself a method of 
practical reason, has its claims, and establishes presumptions that the other methods of 
practical reason may not always be able to overcome.”).  
 51  Gries & Slocum, supra note 9, at 1441; Lee & Mouritsen, supra note 7, at 806–07; 
Mouritsen, supra note 8, at 175–78; Nuñez, supra note 26, at 1520–21; Joseph Scott Miller, 
Reasonable Certainty & Corpus Linguistics, 66 U. KAN. L. REV. 39, 45–46 (2017); 
Lawrence B. Solum, Originalist Methodology, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 269, 283–84 (2017). 
 52  Outside the context of corpus linguistics, and indeed outside the context of statutory 
interpretation, judicial intuition has been both defended and criticized.  See, e.g., Arthur L. 
Corbin, The Interpretation of Words and the Parole Evidence Rule, 50 CORNELL L. REV. 
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Intuition, they argue, is a poor indicator of word meaning.  Although 
intuition may be able to tell an interpreter whether a usage is 
ungrammatical, it cannot reliably be used to measure “the statistical 
frequency of words and word senses.”53  In other words, proponents of 
corpus linguistics argue, to the extent that ordinariness of meaning is linked 
to frequency of use (an assumption certainly open to challenge),54 intuition 
cannot tell a judge which of two grammatical usages is the more ordinary 
one.55  Instead, when judges rely on their intuition, their interpretive 
decisions can obscure why legislative drafters chose to use one term rather 
than another56 or may simply be the result of a particular judge’s 
idiosyncratic lexicon.57  Moreover, even if reliance on intuition is up to the 
task of getting us through our daily lives without great difficulty,58 statutory 
interpretation is a specialized activity that requires a more precise source of 
language data than intuition can provide.  As Professors Lawrence Solan 
and Tammy Gales have described, the fine distinctions among word senses 
that judicial decisions require do not lend themselves to resolution by 
intuition alone.59  Thomas Lee, Associate Justice of the Utah Supreme 
Court, and an outspoken proponent of corpus linguistics, has described 
judicial intuition as “less-than-perfect,”60 “fallible,”61 and “unreliable.”62 
Proponents of corpus linguistics usage point to Judge Richard 
Posner’s use of Google as an example of a well-intentioned, but ultimately 
insufficient, attempt to cure problems associated with intuition.63  In 
Costello, Judge Posner used Google to determine the meaning of the 
 
161, 164 (1965) (arguing that, in the context of contract interpretation, “when a judge 
refuses to consider relevant extrinsic evidence on the ground that the meaning of written 
words is to him plain and clear, his decision is formed by and wholly based upon the 
completely extrinsic evidence of his own personal education and experience”). 
 53  Lee & Mouritsen, supra note 7, at 831. 
 54  See generally Ehrett, supra note 17, at 62–64; Herenstein, supra note 17, at 116–19; 
Hessick, supra note 17, at 1508–09. 
 55  Lee & Mouritsen, supra note 7, at 831; Mouritsen, supra note 8, at 175.  Moreover, 
Chomsky’s views on the innateness of language have been criticized as unsupported by 
biological research and the variety of extant grammatical structures.  See generally Wolfram 
Hinzan, The Philosophical Significance of Universal Grammar, 34 LANG. SCI. 635 (2012). 
 56  Rasabout, 356 P.3d at 1274. 
 57  Mouritsen, supra note 8, at 175.  See Gries & Slocum, supra note 9, at 1441. 
 58  See Miller, supra note 25, at 2 (noting that polysemy “seldom causes any problems” 
in “everyday life”). 
 59  See generally Solan & Gales, supra note 45, at 1311. 
 60  State v. J.M.S., 280 P.3d 410, 419 (Utah 2011) (Lee, J., concurring). 
 61  Rasabout, 356 P.3d at 1275 (Lee, J., concurring).  
 62  In re Adoption of Baby E.Z., 266 P.3d 702, 727 (Utah 2011) (Lee, J., concurring).  
 63  Lee & Mouritsen, supra note 7, at 812–13; Phillips, Ortner & Lee, supra note 8, at 
28–29. 
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statutory term “harbor.”64  Posner first formulated phrases, like “harboring 
fugitives,” and searched for them on Google.  He then noted how many 
search results matched the phrases he formulated and drew conclusions 
about the scope of “harbor” in the statute from the frequency with which 
his phrases appeared in the search results.65  As proponents of corpus 
linguistics techniques have argued, Posner’s use of Google reflects his 
intuition about which phrases containing “harbor” were likely to return 
results that could be compared profitably.66  In other words, he searched 
only for those phrases that he thought were representative of potential 
meanings of harbor in the statute.  His intuition about the possible statutory 
meanings of harbor may have been correct, and his choice of phrases to 
search well-considered, but the results his search returned were limited by 
his intuition about what searches to perform.67 
Corpus users view reliance on corpus data to be a partial antidote to 
the subjectivity they attribute to reliance on intuition.  Professor Lawrence 
Solum has argued that by relying on an individual’s recollection, intuition 
provides only secondary evidence of language usage; corpus linguistics, by 
contrast, provides primary evidence of language usage.68  Other 
commentators have argued that, in contrast with reliance on intuition, 
corpus linguistics is transparent; that is, by relying on data of language 
usage, a corpus user’s conclusions about language usage can be challenged 
by other users.69  Justice Lee made a detailed defense of corpus usage as 
compared with reliance on intuition in his concurring opinion in 
Rasabout.70  In that case, the court interpreted the word “discharge” in a 
statute that prohibited unlawful discharge of a firearm.  The question before 
the court was whether the defendant’s action, firing twelve shots in rapid 
succession at the same target, was a single “discharge” or twelve separate 
discharges.  The majority held that each shot was a separate discharge, 
justifying the conviction of twelve counts of violating the unlawful 
discharge statute.71 
In concurrence, Lee opined that the court’s conclusion was based on 
its equation of “discharge” with “shoot.”  Lee argued that this conclusion, 
while not necessarily wrong, was based on the court’s intuition that 
 
 64  United States v. Costello, 666 F.3d 1040, 1044 (7th Cir. 2012).  
 65  Id.  
 66  Lee & Mouritsen, supra note 7, at 812–13.  
 67  Id.  
 68  Solum, supra note 51, at 283–84. 
 69  Mouritsen, supra note 8, at 202–03; John D. Ramer, Corpus Linguistics: Misfire or 
More Ammo for the Ordinary Meaning Canon, 116 MICH. L. REV. 303, 326 (2017) (arguing 
that “transparency” is the COCA’s greatest strength). 
 70  State v. Rasabout, 356 P.3d 1258, 1274 (Utah 2015) (Lee, J., concurring). 
 71  Id. at 1262–64. 
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“discharge” and “shoot” are roughly synonymous.  Lee objected not to the 
conclusion, but to the fact that the court did not test its intuition against 
alternatives.  When judges rely on intuition, he argued, they often fail to 
acknowledge that there are “alternative senses of the operative terms.”72  
Because a judge’s intuition is based on her particular experiences and 
recollections of a word’s meaning,  the parties are deprived of the ability to 
challenge the basis of judge’s conclusion.  Although a judge’s intuition 
may be representative of general usage, it may be idiosyncratic instead.73  
Corpus linguistics methods, Lee opined, cure this defect in intuition-based 
textual analysis by allowing an interpreter to demonstrate how she 
determined a word’s meaning.  Lee tested his intuition that “discharge” 
means “shoot” by searching a corpus for information about how discharge 
is used when referring to a firearm.  By relying on publicly available data 
rather than intuition, Lee argued, his assumptions can be challenged, his 
methods replicated, and conclusions falsified or validated.74  Other corpus 
users have acknowledged that corpus usage does not completely eliminate 
subjectivity due to reliance on intuition.  Gries and Slocum noted that “a 
certain degree of subjective intuition is virtually unavoidable” in corpus 
analysis.75  And Mouritsen acknowledged that the “human beings at both 
ends of the corpus—the architect and the user” are both “subject to . . . 
errors and biases.”76  But, corpus users tend to agree with Lee that, by 
making the decision-making process more transparent, corpus linguistics 
provides a standard against which one user’s conclusions can be measured 
by another.77 
B. Biased Reference Data and Statutory Interpretation 
When they do not rely on their intuition about the meaning of a text, 
legal interpreters refer to materials outside the text being interpreted to 
determine its meaning.  This, too, is common and uncontroversial, at least 
in some forms.  When an interpreter searches Westlaw to learn how other 
judges have interpreted a statutory term—for example “knowingly and 
willfully”—she is seeking word meaning outside the text of the statute 
itself.78  Seeking meaning from reference data becomes more controversial, 
 
 72  Id. at 1274. 
 73  Id. at 1274–75.  See also id. at 1275 n.10; Gries & Slocum, supra note 9, at 1441. 
 74  Rasabout, 356 P.3d at 1282. 
 75  Gries & Slocum, supra note 9, at 1447.  
 76  Mouritsen, supra note 8, at 203. 
 77  Id.; Ramer, supra note 69, at 326 (arguing that “transparency” is the COCA’s 
greatest strength). 
 78  See, e.g., United States v. Wheeler, 540 F.3d 683, 689 (7th Cir. 2008) (interpreting 
“knowingly and willfully” in embezzlement statute).  For just a few of the hundreds of 
federal and state statutes that use the phrase “knowingly and willfully,” both in the criminal 
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however, when it appears the data consulted have been compiled or 
selected arbitrarily, opportunistically, or otherwise without justification.79  
The much-criticized80 Muscarello case illustrates how courts sometimes 
interpret statutory language by referring to data that appears to be selected 
arbitrarily.81  In Muscarello, the Supreme Court considered whether a 
person “carries” a firearm when he drives with it in his locked glove 
compartment or trunk.  The Court weighed two possible interpretations: if 
carry means only to “bear on one’s person,” then the conduct was not 
prohibited; by contrast, if carry means “transport,” then it covered the 
defendants’ conduct.  The Court interpreted the word carry by referring to 
the use of that word in a wide variety of sources, including Robinson 
Crusoe, Moby Dick, the King James Bible, newspaper articles, and a series 
of dictionaries.82  Although Muscarello has been widely criticized, it is not 
unique.  Courts, with regularity, consult materials outside the text to 
determine the meaning of words in statutes.83  In Whitfield, the Supreme 
Court interpreted the word “accompany” by reference to the use of that 
word in David Copperfield, Pride and Prejudice, and a newspaper 
marriage announcement.84  And as noted above, in Costello, Judge Posner 
performed a Google search to determine the meaning of the word “harbor” 
in a statute that prohibited harboring an alien.85 
Users of corpus linguistics techniques criticize these uses of extra-
textual materials, but not because they object to searching for meaning 
outside the statutory text.  Indeed, corpus users support the search for 
meaning outside the text of the statute being interpreted.86  They do 
criticize, however, what they perceive to be subjective and unprincipled 
references to materials outside the text—what Lee and Mouritsen have 
 
and civil context, see, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2018); 6 U.S.C. § 625 (2018); 15 U.S.C. § 1196 
(2018); 18 U.S.C. § 669 (2018); 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (2018); 21 U.S.C. § 331(yy) (2018); 2 
U.S.C. § 1966 (2018); 42 U.S.C. § 1383 (2018); 49 U.S.C. § 60123 (2018); LA. STAT. ANN. 
§ 18:1505.5 (2006); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 146.84. (West 2006).  
 79  James Brudney & Lawrence Baum, Oasis or Mirage: The Supreme Court’s Thirst 
for Dictionaries in the Rehnquist and Roberts Eras, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 483, 490, 566 
(2013). 
 80  Lee & Mouritsen, supra note 7, at 807–10; Mouritsen, supra note 28, at 1931–32; 
Solan, supra note 45, at 2052–53.  
 81  Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S 125, 126–127 (1998). 
 82  Id. at 128–31. 
 83  Magone v. Heller, 150 U.S. 70, 74–75 (1893) (citing one of Shakespeare’s plays for 
the meaning of statutory text); Bok v. McCaughn, 42 F.2d 616, 618–19 (3d Cir. 1930) 
(citing a version of the Bible for the meaning of statutory text). 
 84  Whitfield v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 785, 788 (2015). 
 85  United States v. Costello, 666 F.3d 1040, 1044 (7th Cir. 2012). 
 86  E.g., Gries & Slocum, supra note 9, at 1441; Lee and Mouritsen, supra note 7, at 
807. 
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called “simple cherry-picking.”87  As Solan has noted, the Muscarello 
Court chose reference materials without offering a reason why they were 
relevant to the interpretive question before the Court.88  For example, the 
Court referred to the Latin and Old French roots of “carry” and to the use 
of the word in a translation of the Bible to derive its meaning.  It is not 
obvious why etymological information or use of a word in translation is 
relevant to the meaning of statutory text and the Court provided no 
explanation.89 
Corpus users have criticized the practice of resorting to dictionaries 
for interpreting statutes especially harshly.90  Although dictionaries are 
routinely consulted by not only the Supreme Court,91 but lower federal 
courts92 and state courts93 as well, the practice has long been criticized by 
scholars.94  Among the many shortcomings that have been described, 
dictionaries are detached from ordinary meaning and legislative intent,95 
they are often deliberately devoid of context,96 they do not purport to 
describe all semantically acceptable word meanings,97 they contain 
 
 87  Lee & Mouritsen, supra note 7, at 807. 
 88  Solan, supra note 45, at 2052.  
 89  Id. (criticizing citation to etymology and the Bible); Mouritsen, supra note 28, at 
1939–40 (criticizing reference to etymology).  The Court hinted at an explanation when it 
noted that the “greatest of writers” have used the term “carry” in the way it suggested.  
Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S 125, 129 (1998).  The Court did not explain the 
relevance to statutory meaning of the way these writers used the phrase. The Court, perhaps, 
was implying that these great writers used the word in a typical or ordinary way. Typical or 
ordinary usage in a novel or the Bible, however, is not the same as typical or ordinary usage 
in a statute. 
 90  Mouritsen, supra note 28, at 1939; BRIAN G. SLOCUM, ORDINARY MEANING: A 
THEORY OF THE MOST FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION 217 (2015). 
 91  E.g., Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074, 1081 (2015); Taniguchi v. Kan Pac. 
Saipan, Ltd., 566 U.S. 560, 566–69 (2012); MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 
512 U.S. 218, 225 (1994); Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 228–29 (1993). 
 92  E.g., Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“dictionaries . . . 
have been properly recognized as among the many tools that can assist the court in 
determining the meaning of particular terminology”); Zatarains, Inc. v. Oak Grove 
Smokehouse, Inc., 698 F.2d 786, 792 (5th Cir. 1983). 
 93  E.g., Wasatch Prop. Mgmt. v. Degrate, 112 P.3d 647, 653 (Cal. 2005); Koontz v. 
Ameritech Servs., Inc., 645 N.W.2d 34, 39 (Mich. 2002); Madison Constr. Co. v. 
Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co., 735 A.2d 100, 107–08 (Pa. 1999). 
 94  Brudney & Baum, supra note 79, at 490, 566; Pamela Hobbs, Defining the Law: 
(Mis)using the Dictionary to Decide Cases, 13 DISCOURSE STUD. 327, 330-31 (2011).  See 
also United States v. Costello, 666 F.3d 1040, 1043–44 (7th Cir. 2012); Cabell v. Markham, 
148 F.2d 737, 739 (2d Cir. 1945). 
 95  Alice A. Wang, Googling for Meaning: Statutory Interpretation in the Digital Age, 
125 YALE L.J.F. 267, 278 (2016). 
 96  Costello, 666 F.3d at 1044; see also Craig v. Provo City, 389 P.3d 423, 428 n.3 
(Utah 2016). 
 97  Aprill, supra note 42, at 297. 
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definitions that support multiple readings of the statute,98 and they are often 
used opportunistically by legal interpreters.99  To take just one recent 
example of the dubious value of judicial use of dictionaries, the Court of 
Appeals of Utah100 relied, in part, on a definition in the Urban 
Dictionary,101 a crowdsourced, online compilation of user-approved phrases 
and their definitions, often including “ad-hoc neologism[s], invented just 
for this dictionary.”102  Similarly, proponents of corpus linguistics have 
criticized Judge Posner’s use of Google, in part, because of the secrecy in 
the way that Google returns search results.  This secrecy, they argue, 
detracts from the ability to replicate the results of a Google search.103 
Proponents of corpus linguistics techniques argue that corpus research 
is not prone to the same biases that affect legal interpreters using reference 
materials like dictionaries or Google.  Using a general corpus, like the 
COCA, they argue, allows a legal interpreter to search for the meaning of a 
word in the context of how words are ordinarily used in spoken and written 
language.104  This process mitigates the bias inherent in the choice of a 
word’s meaning from a list of dictionary definitions, which is necessarily 
acontextual.105  Moreover, they argue, using corpus data broadly 
representative of written and spoken language diminishes the bias 
associated with the interpreter’s choice of a particular dictionary.106  
Compared with Google, proponents of corpus linguistics techniques argue, 
corpora like the COCA are more transparent about the methodologies they 
use to organize search results.  As a result, the use of corpora like the 
COCA is less likely to reflect biases that are unknown and unknowable to 
the average user not privy to Google’s search algorithm.107 
In conclusion, this Part described the dream of objectivity pursued by 
users of corpus linguistics.  It is a dream rooted in perceived deficiencies of 
 
 98  See Craig, 389 P.3d at 428 n.3. 
 99  Brudney & Baum, supra note 79, at 490, 566; Brudney, supra note 42, at 975, 981.  
This is, strictly speaking, a criticism of dictionary use, not of dictionaries themselves.  But, 
to the extent that dictionaries are especially susceptible to opportunistic use, it is worth 
including this flaw among the dictionary’s other shortcomings. 
 100  Utah is, incidentally, the intellectual home of the use of corpus linguistics methods 
for legal interpretation. 
 101  O’Hearon v. Hansen, 409 P.3d 85, 93 n.8 (Utah Ct. App. 2017). 
 102  Virginia Heffernan, Street Smart: The Unruly, Unlexicographical but Surprisingly 
Useful Offerings of Urban Dictionary, N.Y. TIMES, July 5, 2009, at SM16. 
 103  Lee & Mouritsen, supra note 7, at 812.  
 104  Id. at 831–32.   
 105  Gries & Slocum, supra note 9, at 1441.  
 106  Id. at 1438.   
 107  See Eric Goldman, Search Engine Bias and the Demise of Search Engine 
Utopianism, 8 YALE J.L. & TECH. 188, 192–94 (2005-2006).  See also A. Diaz, Through the 
Google Goggles: Sociopolitical Bias in Search Engine Design, in WEB SEARCH: 
MULTIDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES 29–30 (Spink and Zimmer, eds., 2008).  
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common methods of statutory interpretation, like reliance on judicial 
intuition and reliance on certain reference materials extrinsic to the text.  
As corpus users describe these methods of interpretation, they are 
subjective within the definition given earlier.  An interpretation relying on 
intuition is subjective because it is not constrained by effective procedures 
and may be colored by the idiosyncratic knowledge and disposition of the 
interpreter.  Reliance on sources like dictionaries and Google searches is 
subjective because these sources contain data that is biased in favor of 
atypical uses; reliance on these biased data will obscure accurate 
interpretations.  By contrast, they argue, corpus linguistics results are 
objective within the definition described above because they reflect data 
that is broadly representative of ordinary language usage.  Because they 
reflect ordinary language, corpus users argue, they are not susceptible to 
biases that distort the result.  Part IV, below, assesses whether the dream of 
objectivity held by proponents of corpus linguistics withstands scrutiny. 
IV. CORPUS LINGUISTICS AND THE REALITY OF SUBJECTIVITY 
Proponents of corpus linguistics argue that, by using corpus 
linguistics techniques, interpreters can reduce the subjectivity endemic to 
statutory interpretation.108  Although some corpus users acknowledge that 
the elimination of subjectivity is impossible, 109 they argue that corpus 
linguistics methods are not as subjective as other methods of 
interpretation.110  Perhaps most explicitly, Lee and Mouritsen argue that 
corpus linguistics can “help us deliver on the promise of an objective 
inquiry”111 and, in particular, help textualism deliver on its “promise of 
determinacy.”112  Indeed, as Professor Carissa Byrne Hessick explained in 
her critique of using corpus linguistics techniques to interpret criminal 
statutes, much of the appeal of corpus linguistics is “that it promises us 
right answers.”113  Because users of corpus linguistics for statutory 
interpretation place such weight on its ability to reduce subjectivity, it is 
appropriate to assess the depth and contours of the subjectivity involved in 
using corpus linguistics itself.  Only then can potential users of corpus 
linguistics techniques for statutory interpretation—including judges and 
scholars—make an informed decision about whether corpus linguistics 
 
 108 State v. Rasabout, 356 P.3d 1258, 1274–75 (Utah 2015) (Lee, J., concurring); State v. 
J.M.S., 280 P.3d 410, 419 (Utah 2011) (Lee, J., concurring); Gries & Slocum, supra note 9, 
at 1441; Lee and Mouritsen, supra note 7, at 867; Mouritsen, supra note 8, at 175–78; 
Nuñez, supra note 26, at 1521; Phillips & White, supra note 26, at 186–87. 
 109  Gries & Slocum, supra note 9, at 1447; Mouritsen, supra note 8, at 203. 
 110  Gries & Slocum, supra note 9, at 1441; Lee and Mouritsen, supra note 7, at 807. 
 111  Lee & Mouritsen, supra note 7, at 796. 
 112  Id. at 876. 
 113  Hessick, supra note 17, at 1519. 
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techniques offer any advantage over other methods of interpretation. 
Despite the emphasis that users of corpus linguistics place on its 
subjectivity-reducing capabilities, corpus linguistics techniques involve 
significant subjective interpretive choices.  These choices disrupt the dream 
of objectivity held by proponents of corpus linguistics as a method of 
statutory interpretation.  There are a number of distinct points during the 
interpretive process at which a user of corpus techniques must make a 
subjective decision that influences the interpretive outcome.  First, at the 
beginning of the interpretive process, a user of corpus linguistics 
techniques must choose a particular corpus to search.  Just as a legal 
interpreter resorting to a dictionary must choose one or more dictionaries to 
consult,114 users of corpus linguistics techniques must choose a particular 
corpus to search.  There are many different corpora.  Each contains a 
different mix of texts and reliance on one does not lead to the same results 
on reliance on another.115  Second, the user must choose search parameters.  
If a statute makes it a crime to “carry a firearm,” for example, the corpus 
user must decide whether to search for the word “carry,” the phrase “carry 
a firearm,” or some other term.116  The corpus user also must decide 
whether and how to customize the search to return results indicating only 
certain parts of speech,117 or results reflecting certain geographic 
locations,118 speech communities,119 or time periods.120  Third, a corpus 
search will often return results that the user believes are not germane to the 
statutory inquiry.  The user of corpus linguistics techniques must make a 
subjective decision about which search results to evaluate and which results 
to exclude from evaluation.121 
Because each of these three sources of subjectivity is significant 
enough to warrant its own separate treatment, this Article will explore just 
the first source of subjectivity identified above: the choice of corpus.  This 
Part first examines the act of choosing a corpus and concludes that, rather 
than leading to an objective interpretation, the choice of corpus introduces 
subjectivity into the interpretive process.  It next assesses the choice of 
corpus consistently made by users of corpus techniques—a general corpus 
populated by nonlegal language—and concludes that it is the wrong choice 
 
 114  Aprill, supra note 42, at 296–97; Gries & Slocum, supra note 9, at 1421. 
 115  Solan & Gales, supra note 17, at 1311.  Compare NOW CORPUS (NEWS ON THE 
WEB), https://corpus.byu.edu/now (last visited Sept. 16, 2019) with CORPUS HISTORICAL 
AM. ENG., https://corpus.byu.edu/coha (last visited Sept. 16, 2019).  
 116  Solan & Gales, supra note 17, at 1346. 
 117  Ramer, supra note 69, at 327.  See also Gries & Slocum, supra note 9, at 1448. 
 118  E.g., Lee & Mouritsen, supra note 7, at 857. 
 119  Solan, supra note 45, at 2059. 
 120  Lee & Mouritsen, supra note 7, at 857.  
 121  E.g., Lee & Mouritsen, supra note 7, at 850–51. 
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for statutory interpretation.  Finally, it considers the possibility of using a 
still-hypothetical “legal corpus;” it concludes that this hypothetical corpus 
would not ameliorate the subjectivity problems that plague the choice of 
corpus. 
A. The Choice of Corpus is Subjective 
Just as a legal interpreter resorting to a dictionary must choose a 
particular dictionary to use, so too must the user of corpus linguistics 
techniques choose a corpus to search.  The choice of corpus is subjective 
because it is not constrained by any principle that suggests why one corpus 
rather than another should be chosen.  As Professor Solan has explained, 
there is nothing internal to a particular corpus that requires its use in certain 
circumstances.122  Likewise, there is nothing about a particular term or 
phrase that tells the interpreter which corpus to use when searching for its 
meaning.  As a result, simply by opting for a corpus search, the user of 
corpus linguistics techniques introduces a subjective element into the 
interpretive process. 
Corpus usage confirms that the choice of corpus is subjective: corpus 
users rely on multiple or different corpora without articulating a standard 
for determining when one corpus would be appropriate and another would 
not be appropriate.  Take Lee and Mouritsen’s searches for the terms 
“vehicle,” “carry,” and “interpreter” in their work advocating the adoption 
of corpus techniques.123  Lee and Mouritsen rely on searches in the News 
on the Web (NOW) Corpus and the Corpus of Historical American English 
(COHA) without describing why either or both of these corpora are 
appropriate for their searches and despite the significant differences 
between the texts found in these corpora.124  The NOW Corpus, for 
example, contains not only news sources, but also online magazines with 
subjects as diverse as video games, cricket, and fashion.  And the origin of 
these web sources?  The NOW Corpus includes texts that come not only 
from the United States, but, unless specifically excluded by the researcher, 
texts from markedly different linguistic communities, like India, Nigeria, 
Singapore, Kenya, Pakistan, and the Philippines, among others.125  The 
 
 122  Solan, supra note 45, at 2059–60.  See also Solan & Gales, supra note 17, at 1314–
15.  
 123  Lee & Mouritsen, supra note 7, at 836–51. 
 124  Id.  See Solan, supra note 42, at 60–61 (arguing that there is a substantive choice 
involved in searching for ordinary meaning rather than an expansive meaning or specialized 
meaning). 
 125  NOW CORPUS (NEWS ON THE WEB), supra note 115.  The NOW Corpus contains 
“8.5 billion words of data from web-based newspapers and magazines from 2010 to the 
present time.  More importantly, the corpus grows by about 140–160 million words of data 
each month (from about 300,000 new articles), or about 1.8 billion words each year.”  It is 
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COHA, by contrast, includes different kinds of texts, including movie 
scripts and poetry.126 
Some proponents of corpus linguistics techniques acknowledge that 
they must choose a corpus, but minimize the significance of the choice by 
suggesting that it is driven by a distinction between “ordinary” words and 
legal terms of art.127  If the word under consideration is an “ordinary” one, 
they search for it in a general corpus, like the COHA, the COCA, or the 
NOW Corpus; by contrast, if it is a legal term of art, some intimate that 
interpreters should use a still-hypothetical specialized legal corpus.128  
However, framing the choice of corpus as a choice between an ordinary 
term and a legal term of art does not eliminate its subjectivity; it merely 
substitutes one subjective decision for another.  The determination that a 
word is ordinary itself reflects a subjective decision because there is not an 
objective way to distinguish between ordinary words and legal terms of 
art.129  As linguists have noted, the line between legal terms of art and 
ordinary words is indistinct at best.  David Mellinkoff notes that not every 
word “that has the sound of the law is a term of art.”130  Conversely, many 
words that sound ordinary, because they are used in nonlegal settings, also 
have specialized legal meanings.131  For these reasons, the “difference 
 
possible to limit NOW’s results by country. 
 126   CORPUS HISTORICAL AM. ENG., supra note 115. 
 127  See Phillips, Ortner & Lee, supra note 8, at 23 (asserting without explanation that 
“corruption of blood” is a term of art while “commerce” is an ordinary word).  
 128  Phillips, Ortner & Lee, supra note 8, at 24–25.  See also Solan, supra note 42, at 59–
60 (noting that searching a corpus designed to reflect ordinary meaning is not very useful 
for determining the meaning of terms of art).  Cf. James A. Heilpern, Dialects of Art: A 
Corpus-Based Approach to Technical Term of Art Determinations in Statutes, 58 
JURIMETRICS 4, 380 (2018) (suggesting that technical terms of art (but not legal terms of art) 
should be interpreted according to meaning found in technical documents). 
 129  E.g., Heikki E. S. Mattila, Legal Vocabulary, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
LANGUAGE AND LAW, supra note 6, at 29, 31 (“The difference between legal terms and 
words of ordinary language is relative and hard to define.”); DAVID MELLINKOFF, THE 
LANGUAGE OF THE LAW 17–18 (2004) (describing that some, but not every, legal-sounding 
term is a term of art and that some legal words are intended for both lawyers and non-
lawyers); PETER M. TIERSMA, LEGAL LANGUAGE 107–08 (1999); Isabel Richard, Is Legal 
Lexis Characteristic of Legal Language, 11 J. LEGAL LEXICOLOGY 1, 9 (2018) (“Firstly, 
legal lexis is used by law, but not exclusively, and may have legal meaning, but not 
necessarily.”).  
 130  MELLINKOFF, supra note 129, at 17. 
 131  Mattila, supra note 129, at 31 (“[T]he use of ordinary words in a technical legal 
sense is particularly widespread.”); MELLINKOFF, supra note 129, at 11–12; Ralf Poscher, 
Ambiguity and Vagueness in Legal Interpretation, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
LANGUAGE AND LAW, supra note 6, at 132; Frederick Schauer, Hohfeld on Legal Language, 
in THE LEGACY OF WESLEY HOHFELD: EDITED MAJOR WORKS, SELECT PERSONAL PAPERS, 
AND ORIGINAL COMMENTARIES 7–8 (Shyam Balganesh et al. eds., forthcoming), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3183858 (noting that words like search 
and seizure have legal meanings that are both over- and under-inclusive of their ordinary 
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between legal terms and words of ordinary language is relative and hard to 
define.”132  Even linguists who are more optimistic about the possibility of 
identifying legal terms of art recognize the significant disagreement over 
what constitutes a legal term.133  Because choosing to designate a statutory 
term ordinary rather than legal does not appear to be “reliably 
constrained,”134 the choice between a general corpus and a still-
hypothetical specialized legal corpus is subjective.135 
Practice confirms the subjectivity of designating a term ordinary or 
legal.  Rather than announcing and adhering to a standard for 
distinguishing between ordinary terms and legal terms, corpus users treat 
terms as ordinary without analysis and without adhering to any discernable 
principle.  For example, corpus users have searched for the statutory terms 
“results in,”136 “information,”137 and “discharge”138 in the COCA.  In none 
of these cases did the interpreters demonstrate that they applied some rule 
or principle to determine whether these words were ordinary rather than 
legal terms.  The recent American Bankers case is illustrative of the lack of 
standards applied by corpus users choosing a general corpus.  In that case, 
the court relied on searches in the COHA and databases of newspaper 
articles139 without acknowledging that these corpora differ in essential 
ways.  Similarly, in the Harris case, the Michigan Supreme Court relied on 
a search in the COCA to uncover the meaning of the term “information.”140  
The court asserted that it was searching for the ordinary meaning of the 
term, but did not justify this assertion.  Curiously, the court purported to 
rely on a statute that governs statutory interpretation in that state.  The 
statute the court relied on, however, provides no support for the proposition 
 
meaning); David A. Strauss, Why Plain Meaning?, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1565, 1568 
(1997) (“Moreover, the so-called ‘ordinary meaning’ is not so ordinary.  It is the ordinary 
legal meaning . . . . Terms like witness, zoning, even speed limit, when used in a legal 
context, can mean something quite different from what they might mean when used in other 
contexts.”). 
 132  Mattila, supra note 129, at 31.  See also TIERSMA, supra note 129, at 108 (the 
distinction between terms of art and legal jargon “is mainly one of degree”). 
 133  TIERSMA, supra note 129, at 108. 
 134  Lovett, supra note 44, at 139 (defining arbitrary power).  In the context of 
“intersubjectivity,” “the opposite of validity is arbitrariness.”  EDLIN, supra note 44, at 59. 
 135  As will be discussed in Part IV.C, infra, even if it were possible to determine 
objectively that a statutory term is a legal term of art rather than an ordinary term, a single 
term of art can have multiple meanings because there is not a single “legal English.”  
 136  Wilson v. Safelite, Grp., Inc., 930 F.3d 429, 439–40 (6th Cir. 2019) (Thapar, J., 
concurring). 
 137  People v. Harris, 885 N.W.2d 832, 839, 839 n.33 (Mich. 2016). 
 138  State v. Rasabout, 356 P.3d 1258, 1274–75 (Utah 2015) (Lee, J., concurring). 
 139 Am. Bankers Ass’n v. Nat’l Credit Union Admin, 306 F. Supp. 2d 44, 68 n.5 (D.D.C. 
2018).  
 140  Harris, 885 N.W.2d at 839. 
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that the word at issue should be interpreted as an ordinary term; rather, it 
simply provides that an ordinary word should be given its ordinary 
meaning while a term of art should be interpreted according to its 
appropriate technical meaning.141  Nevertheless, the court searched a 
general corpus without indicating why the word “information” in the 
statute was an ordinary one rather than a legal term of art.142 
Moreover, even when corpus users acknowledge that ordinary terms 
and specialized terms should be treated differently, the reason for their 
choice of a general corpus is obscure.  Take, for example, the Utah case, In 
re: Baby E.Z.  In his dissent, Justice Lee considered the interpretation of 
the word “custody” in the federal Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act.  Lee 
acknowledged that statutory terms of art should be read according to their 
legal meaning rather than their ordinary meaning.143  He found that the 
statutory term was a legal term that should be interpreted according to its 
legal meaning.144  Nevertheless, Justice Lee proceeded to search for 
“custody” in the COCA,145 a general corpus that includes transcriptions of 
spoken language, fiction, popular magazines, newspaper articles, and 
academic works but, crucially, no statutory text.146  Lee’s reliance on the 
COCA in Baby E.Z. suggests that corpus users are not relying on a 
distinction between ordinary terms and legal terms when choosing a 
corpus.  That is, it appears that no matter whether a word is a legal term or 
an ordinary one, the corpus user will search a general corpus for its 
meaning.  If Lee’s use of the COCA in Baby E.Z. is the correct way to use 
corpus techniques to interpret statutes, it is difficult to imagine the 
existence of a test that can be used to choose a corpus objectively. 
B. A Corpus of Nonlegal Language is the Wrong Choice for Statutory 
Interpretation 
Users of corpus linguistics techniques for statutory interpretation 
rely—virtually exclusively—on searches in general corpora, like the 
COCA or the COHA.  The justification for interpreting statutory language 
in accordance with the meaning of words in a general corpus rests on the 
assumption that the meaning of words in a general corpus is the same, in a 
 
 141  MICH. COMP. LAWS § 8.3(a) (2017).  
 142  See also Rasabout, 356 P.3d at 1274–75 (Lee, J., concurring) (rejecting without 
explanation the argument that a statutory term was used as a legal term). 
 143  In re Adoption of Baby E.Z., 266 P.3d 702, 723-24 (Utah 2011) (Lee, J., 
concurring).  
 144  Id. (“Instead, the omission of a definition for the term ‘custody’ and its repeated use 
in the [Act] suggest that we ought to interpret the term with reference to its ordinary legal 
meaning.”). 
 145  Id. at 724–25 n.23. 
 146  CORPUS CONTEMPORARY AM. ENG., supra note 30. 
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relevant way, as the meaning of those same words in statutes.  Users of 
corpus linguistics for statutory interpretation justify the equation of 
statutory language and general corpus language by suggesting that statutory 
language and general corpus language are both “ordinary” uses of 
language.  That is, they argue that the law often requires them to look for 
the “ordinary meaning” of statutory language and that they can find this 
meaning by looking at the way language is used in a general corpus.147 
Embedded in this argument is the premise that the ordinary meaning 
of statutory language is its nonlegal meaning.148  A number of scholars, 
including scholars of corpus linguistics, have suggested that it would be 
normatively attractive if this were true.  Professor Slocum explains that if 
“one assumes that successful communication is the goal in most cases,” 
then statutes “should be understood by different people in the same 
way . . . .  [Therefore,] legal texts should be understandable to the general 
public, as well as to judges and sophisticated practitioners.”149 
There is, of course, ample authority for the proposition that the law 
ought to provide notice to those who are governed by it.  Famously, if 
unrealistically, Jeremy Bentham argued that laws ought to put into the 
mind of the citizen “an exact idea of the will of the legislator.”150  More 
 
 147  E.g. Wilson v. Safelite Grp., Inc., 930 F.3d 429, 439 (6th Cir. 2019) (Thapar, J., 
concurring). 
 148  This argument also assumes that courts are in fact attempting to interpret statutory 
language to conform with ordinary meaning, however defined.  It is true that courts 
sometimes claim that they are searching for a term’s ordinary meaning.  It would be a 
mistake, however, to read too much into judicial statements that courts are in fact attempting 
to interpret statutory language according to its ordinary meaning.  For one reason, courts 
typically do not confine their interpretations to ordinary meaning.  SLOCUM, supra note 90, 
at 172–174.  As Miranda McGowan noted, the “ordinary meaning rule,” if it can be called a 
rule, is “riddled with exceptions.”  Miranda McGowan, Do as I Do, Not as I Say: An 
Empirical Investigation of Justice Scalia’s Ordinary Meaning Method of Statutory 
Interpretation, 78 MISS. L.J. 129, 140, 157 (2008).  See also Linda D. Jellum, On Reading 
the Language of Statutes, 8 U. MASS. L. Rev. 184, 204 (2013).  For another reason, just as 
often as courts claim that they are interpreting legal language according to its ordinary 
meaning, they suggest that they are relying on the “plain meaning” of the text, a phrase that 
linguists do not take to mean the same thing as “ordinary.”  SLOCUM, supra note 90, at 22, 
24–26.  See, e.g. Kingdomware Techs., Inc. v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1969, 1978 (2016) 
(applying the plain meaning of statutory language despite the statute’s prefatory language 
announcing a different objective); Lockhart v. United States, 546 U.S. 142, 146 (2005) 
(giving effect to plain meaning although Congress may not have intended it); Lamie v. U.S. 
Tr., 540 U.S. 526, 535 (2004) (applying plain meaning although the sentence is 
“awkward”); I.N.S. v. Phinpathya, 464 U.S. 183, 192 (1984) (applying the “plain meaning 
of the statute” “however severe the consequences”).  Because courts do not always purport 
to apply a statute’s ordinary meaning, and because, even when they do, they do not always 
apply the ordinary meaning in fact, it is misplaced to rely on judicial statements about their 
search for ordinary meaning to conclude that it is appropriate to interpret statutory language 
according to its ordinary meaning. 
 149  Slocum, supra note 17, at 14.  
 150  E.g., Jeremy Bentham, A General View of a Complete Code of Laws, in 3 THE 
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modestly, Professor Richard Fallon suggests that law “too far divorced 
from its ordinary understanding would not be legitimate.”151  And the 
Supreme Court has reiterated that laws must “give the person of ordinary 
intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he 
may act accordingly.”152  But, the normative judgment that legislatures 
should speak in language that is intelligible to the general public is not the 
same as the descriptive claim that legislatures do in fact speak in the type 
of language found in a general corpus—that is—nonlegal language.  
Instead, the validity of searching a general corpus for the meaning of 
statutory language depends on the descriptive claim that nonlegal language 
is relevantly similar to statutory language.153 
There is significant scholarly debate about whether legal language is 
the same as nonlegal language in a way that is relevant to statutory 
interpretation.154  Here, I will identify and discuss the differences between 
nonlegal language and statutory language that bear directly on the question 
of searching for statutory meaning in a general corpus.155  I demonstrate 
 
WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 207–08 (1816). 
 151  Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Statutory Interpretation Muddle, 114 NW. L. REV. 269, 
331 (2019). 
 152  Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972).  
 153  See Peter M. Tiersma, Some Myths About Legal Language, in SPEAKING OF 
LANGUAGE AND LAW 27, 32 (Lawrence M. Solan et al. eds., Oxford Univ. Press, 2015) 
(noting the longstanding hope that law can be expressed in a way that is understood by 
ordinary people, but concluding that this is unlikely).  Moreover, the normative argument 
that legislatures should speak in nonlegal language is doubtful.  Because of the complex 
tasks that modern legislation is designed to accomplish, any attempt by legislatures to write 
in nonlegal language is apt to be ineffective.  
 154  E.g., Andrei Marmor, The Pragmatics of Legal Language, 21 RATIO JURIS 423, 429 
(2008); Frederick Schauer, On the Relationship Between Legal and Ordinary Language, in 
SPEAKING OF LANGUAGE AND LAW, supra note 153, at 35; Frederick Schauer, Is Law a 
Technical Language, 52 SAN DIEGO L. Rev. 501, 501–02 (2015); Schauer, supra note 131, 
at 18-21; SLOCUM, supra note 90, at 5–14; William Baude & Stephen Sachs, The Law of 
Interpretation, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1082, 1085–87 (2017); Summers, supra note 45, at 229; 
David A. Strauss, Why Plain Meaning?, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1565, 1568 (1997); Paul 
E. McGreal, Slighting Context: On the Illogic of Ordinary Speech in Statutory 
Interpretation, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 325, 334–35 (2004); Marc Poirier, On Whose Authority? 
Linguists’ Claim of Authority to Interpret Statutes, 73 WASH. U. L. Q. 1025, 1033–34, 1057 
(1995); Victoria Nourse, Two Kinds of Plain Meaning, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 997, 1000–05 
(2011); Mark Greenberg, Legislation as Communication? Legal Interpretation and the 
Study of Linguistic Communication, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF LANGUAGE IN THE 
LAW 217, 221 (2011); Stephen F. Ross, The Limited Relevance of Plain Meaning, 73 WASH. 
U. L. Q. 1057, 1064–65 (1995); John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Original 
Methods Originalism: A New Theory of Interpretation and the Case Against Construction, 
103 NW. U. L. REV. 751, 765 (2009); McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 18, at 1356–60; 
see also Jim Chen, Law as a Species of Language Acquisition, WASH. U. L. Q. 1263, 1286–
87 (1995). 
 155  Although these same arguments can also be made about some conceptions of 
ordinary meaning outside of the context of corpus linguistics, they apply with special force 
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that statutory language and the language of texts found in a general corpus 
have different purposes, audiences, and other linguistic characteristics, like 
word choice and syntax.  In other words, statutory language and nonlegal 
language do not share the same context.  Because of their different 
contexts, interpreting statutory language according to the meaning of those 
same words in nonlegal texts fails to capture meaning attributable to the 
fact that the words are, in fact, found in statutes.  As a result, the meaning 
of statutory text cannot be equated with the meaning of nonlegal texts for 
the purpose of interpreting statutes.  It is therefore a mistake to interpret 
terms in a statute according to the meaning of those same words found in a 
general corpus. 
1. Statutes and the Texts of a General Corpus Have Different 
Purposes 
There are many ways, at many different levels of abstraction, to 
describe the purposes of statutory language.156  But, it is not necessary to 
decide on the legitimacy of these purposes of statutory language, or 
prioritize them, to conclude that statutory language serves different 
purposes than the language found in the texts of a general corpus.157 
Statutory language is authored for a different purpose than the type of 
language found in a general corpus.  Most obviously, statutory language is 
written to prescribe behavior.158  That is, statutes are written to control 
 
to the context of searches in general corpora to find meaning in statutory texts.  Because a 
search in a general corpus deliberately seeks meaning wholly outside of the legal context, 
the meaning returned by such a search will fail to reflect the unique features of statutory 
language. 
 156  Jeremy Bentham described legislation’s purpose as “the happiness of the body 
politic,” which includes subsistence, abundance, equality, and security.  JEREMY BENTHAM, 
BENTHAM’S THEORY OF LEGISLATION 123 (Etienne Dumont ed. & trans., 1914).  This is the 
model of legislation that courts have in mind when they routinely uphold statutes addressing 
“broad and general social or economic problem[s].”  Energy Reserves Grp. v. Kan. Power 
and Light, 459 U.S. 400, 411–12 (1983).  Certainly, this public-regarding model of 
legislation is subject to challenge: while “some legislation serves legitimate public-
regarding” goals, other legislation can “only be described as amorally redistributive.”  
Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory 
Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223, 228 (1986) (citation 
omitted).  For example, rather than providing a rule of general applicability, special 
legislation provides a rule that applies only to a particular individual, often providing special 
benefits to named individuals.  Evan C. Zoldan, Reviving Legislative Generality, 98 MARQ. 
L. REV. 625 (2014); Evan C. Zoldan, Legislative Design and the Controllable Costs of 
Special Legislation, 78 MD. L. REV. 415 (2019) [hereinafter Zoldan, Legislative Design].  
 157  Greenberg, supra note 154, at 233–40; cf. SLOCUM, supra note 90, at 5–6 (arguing 
that communicative content of statutory language is presumptively its meaning, although 
this presumption is defeasible). 
 158  Fiss, supra note 4, at 751; Marmor, supra note 154, at 425 (“Legal norms prescribe 
modes of conduct, grant rights, [and] impose obligations . . . .”). 
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conduct by providing rules of decision for individuals, administrative 
agencies, and courts to follow.159  Because it is written to control conduct, 
statutory language, unlike the language found in a general corpus, uses 
constructions that are effective at requiring or prohibiting action or granting 
authority.160  For example, statutes often prohibit conduct in the way that 
the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) begins its long list of prohibited 
acts: “The following acts and the causing thereof are prohibited . . . .”161  
Similarly, statutes vesting authority in agencies often begin the way that the 
FDCA vests rulemaking authority in the Secretary of Health and Human 
Services: “[t]he authority to promulgate regulations for the efficient 
enforcement of this chapter . . . is vested in the Secretary.”162 
Furthermore, statutory language is written for the purpose of making 
some change to the law.  As a result, it is phrased to conform with 
legislative drafting conventions for lawmaking.163  In Congress, for 
example, the legislature must use the following language to enact a statute: 
“Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United 
States of America in Congress assembled.”164  Moreover, unlike nonlegal 
language, legislation is written to classify future conduct or objects.  As a 
result, it is written in general, prospective, impersonal language in order to 
encompass both conduct that is known and conduct that is unknown.165  
Again, the FDCA provides typical phrasing, prohibiting in general and 
impersonal terms “the adulteration or misbranding of any food, drug, 
device, tobacco product, or cosmetic . . . .”166 
Because legislative drafters write language with the purpose of 
accomplishing some important real-world goal, they use language to 
achieve their desired results and minimize the damage of unintended 
consequences.167  Sometimes, this purpose leads legislators to “seek to 
achieve a high level of explicitness and thus to minimize or perhaps even 
 
 159  Marmor, supra note 154, at 425; Maurizio Gotti, Text and Genre, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF LANGUAGE AND LAW,  supra note 6, at 52, 63 (noting that function of 
legislative language is to “impose obligations and or confer rights”). 
 160  See Yon Malley, The Language of Legislation, 16 LANGUAGE & SOC’Y 28, 40 
(1987).  
 161  21 U.S.C. § 331 (2018). 
 162  Id. § 371.  
 163  See Malley, supra note 160, at 30. 
 164  1 U.S.C. § 101 (2018). 
 165  Malley, supra note 160, at 40.  Rarely, legislation is purposefully written in language 
that is not general and prospective.  For example, special legislation singles out a particular 
individual for special treatment.  See e.g. Zoldan, Legislative Design, supra note 156 at 422. 
 166  21 U.S.C. § 331(b). 
 167  Nicholas Allott & Benjamin Shaer, Inference and Intention in Legal Interpretation, 
in THE PRAGMATIC TURN IN LAW 116 (Jane Giltrow et al. eds., 2017). 
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eliminate implicated content . . . .”168  Conversely, statutory language can 
also be unusually vague or ambiguous compared with ordinary language.169  
This general principle is borne out by empirical work on Congress.  In their 
interviews of Capitol Hill staffers, Professors Victoria Nourse and Jane 
Schachter confirmed that ambiguity or vagueness is often a feature of 
legislative language, not a result of error in its drafting: where legislators 
harbor different policy opinions on a key point, they often agree to use 
ambiguous or vague language, each hoping that an agency or court will 
later resolve the uncertainty in his favor.170 
Whether unusually explicit or unusually vague, legal language is often 
complex precisely because it has the purpose of addressing a complex 
social issue that cannot be reduced to simple language.171  Consider the 
Affordable Care Act,172 the Social Security Act,173 or countless other 
transformative modern statutes.  These statutes did not merely tinker with 
well-known common law concepts; they completely reorganized the 
relationship between the citizen and the state within their subject matters.  
Complex concepts, addressed by modern legislation, cannot be expressed 
in language that is simple enough for untrained people to understand while 
still accomplishing what it is supposed to accomplish.174 
Conversely, attempting to render statutory language into words that 
can be readily grasped by a person without legal training may make a 
statute ineffective.175  An example from Australia provides evidence of the 
challenges legislative drafters face when trying to draft statutory language 
as if it were nonlegal speech.  In order to make the statute easily 
understood, Australian legislative drafters wrote the Coroners Bill in 
simple, nonlegal language.  It did not take long, however, for lawyers and 
judges to determine that there were large, unintended gaps in the law.  
Moreover, many of the bill’s ramifications were not obvious from the 
statute’s language, including the consequences for failing to comply with 
 
 168  Id. 
 169  SLOCUM, supra note 90, at 196–97.  
 170  Victoria F. Nourse & Jane S. Schachter, The Politics of Legislative Drafting: A 
Congressional Case Study, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575, 595–96 (2002).  See also Summers, 
supra note 45, at 243.  
 171  Duncan Berry, Legislative Drafting: Could Our Statutes Be Simpler, 1987 STAT. L. 
REV. 92, 93 (1987). 
 172  The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111–148, 124 Stat. 119 
(2010).  
 173  Social Security Act, Pub. L. No. 74–271, 49 Stat. 620 (1935).  
 174  Rabeea Assay, Can the Law Speak Directly to Its Subjects, 38 J. L. & SOC’Y 376, 
399–401 (2011); I.M.L. Turnbull, Problems of Legislative Drafting, 1986 STAT. L. REV. 67, 
68 (1986). 
 175  See Christopher Williams, Legal English and Plain Language: An Introduction, in 
ESP ACROSS CULTURES 111, 122 (2004). 
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the law.176 
Not only is statutory language authored for a different purpose than 
nonlegal language, it is also read for a different purpose than nonlegal 
language.  Because a reader of legislative language often has the goal of 
learning what conduct is prohibited or permitted,177 an interpreter reads 
statutory text for a statement of a rule, the outer limits of the application of 
the rule, exceptions to the rule, similarities or differences in language 
between different parts of the text, and other features that are uniquely 
important for the purpose of learning what conduct is permitted or 
prohibited.  By contrast, a person reading a play, poem, or other nonlegal 
text will not be reading it for these same purposes.  As a result, a reader 
will interpret a word in a nonlegal text differently than she would interpret 
the very same word in a statute.  As Professors McGinnis and Rappaport 
described this phenomenon, legal texts are read against background 
understandings about how the text should be read and interpreted.178  
Moreover, this point has been demonstrated experimentally: in one study, 
subjects were given a text and told that their purpose in reading it was 
“studying.”  Researchers determined that the subjects “employed stringent 
standards focused on intratextual relations, striving for deep understanding 
and coherence in their representation of the texts.”179  By contrast, subjects 
tasked to read the very same texts for the purpose of “entertainment” were 
“much less concerned with constructing a coherent representation of the 
text itself but instead focused more on connecting text events to their own 
personal experiences.”180  The study authors concluded that “when the text 
genre, reading task, and/ or reader motivation varies, readers systematically 
alter their criteria for comprehension and, hence, generate predictably 
different patterns of inferences.”181  In other words, simply having a 
different purpose leads subjects to think about, and ultimately interpret, a 
text differently.  Because people read statutory language for different 
purposes than ordinary texts, the very same person is likely to 
systematically interpret the words of statutes differently than she would 
 
 176  Berry, supra note 171, at 101. 
 177  Gustavo Arosemena, Human Rights, in INTRODUCTION TO LAW 261 (2014) (“One 
natural way to look at the law is to see it as a collection of rules laid down by a competent 
authority that tell us in more or less concrete terms what we should do, what is required, 
prohibited and permitted.”).  
 178  McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 18, at 1340–41. 
 179  Paul Van Den Broek, Robert F. Lorch, Jr., Tracy Linderholm & Mary Gustafson, 
The Effects of Readers’ Goals on Inference Generation and Memory for Texts, 29 MEMORY 
& COGNITION 1081, 1085 (2001). 
 180  Id. 
 181  Id. at 1082.  See also Gregory Schraw & Rayne Sperling Dennison, The Effect of 
Reader Purpose on Interest and Recall, 26 J. READING BEHAV. 1, 14–15 (1994) (showing 
that differences in memory and interest follow from different reading goals). 
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interpret those same words when they are found in the texts of a general 
corpus. 
2. Statutes and the Texts of a General Corpus Have Different 
Audiences 
Texts, including statutory texts, are addressed to specific audiences.182  
The texts of a general corpus, like the COCA, include transcripts of 
“unscripted conversation from more than 150 different TV and radio 
programs,” “[s]hort stories and plays from literary magazines, children’s 
magazines,” popular magazines covering subjects as diverse as “health, 
home and gardening, women, financial, religion, [and] sports,” newspapers, 
and academic journals.183  The diversity of these texts suggest that, if there 
is a single audience for the texts in the COCA, it is a general audience 
(perhaps an audience of hypothetical reasonable people) without a single, 
shared set of norms for interpreting language.184  By contrast, the audience 
of statutory text always includes public officials, subject-matter experts, 
lawyers, and judges, all of whom interpret law in light of their professional 
roles and obligations.  As a result, it should come as no surprise that 
general audiences are unable to understand statutory text. 
i. The Audience of Statutes Always Includes Experts 
Interpreting in Their Official Capacity 
The audience of statutes always includes experts who interpret 
statutory language in their official capacity.  First, many statutes are 
addressed exclusively to users of language who have an institutional role in 
the interpretation and enforcement of the statute; indeed, these statutes do 
not even purport to act on individuals without an official interpretive role.  
As Edward Rubin described, statutes addressed to public officials, like 
regulators who supply the content of the law, dominate lawmaking.185  
According to Rubin, “[m]odern legislation in its essence is an institutional 
practice by which the legislature . . . issues directives to the governmental 
mechanisms that implement that policy.”186  That the audience of most 
modern statutes consists of government officials rather than the public in 
general is most clearly true with respect to statutes that vest broad authority 
 
 182  Malley, supra note 160, at 33. 
 183  CORPUS CONTEMPORARY AM. ENG., supra note 30 (describing texts and registers). 
 184  Lee & Mouritsen, supra note 7, at 793. 
 185  Edward L. Rubin, Law and Legislation in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. 
REV. 369, 381–82, 404 (1989) (arguing that the ordinary citizen is not apprised of legal rules 
“by their verbal formulation in the statute books”); Ross, supra note 154, at 1057 (noting 
that non-criminal statutes are directed at “a small community of lawyers, regulators, and 
people subject to their specific regulations”).  
 186  Rubin, supra note 185, at 372. 
ZOLDAN (DO NOT DELETE) 11/15/2019  6:03 PM 
2019] THE DREAM OF OBJECTIVITY 431 
in administrative agencies to interpret and enforce the law.187  Take, for 
example, the Federal Land Policy and Management Act, which governs 
how federal lands are managed.  It directs federal agencies to establish 
federal land leasing programs,188 maintain an inventory of public lands and 
their value,189 dispose of or acquire land, and most broadly, “promulgate 
rules and regulations to carry out the purposes” of the statute.190  This 
statute, and countless others like it, are addressed only to institutional 
actors (both lawyers and nonlawyers) who are steeped in the particular 
missions and vernacular of their agencies and who read statutory language 
in light of their roles, knowledge, and professional obligations.  Statutory 
language vesting authority in institutional actors is addressed to these 
actors and reflects these roles, knowledge, and professional obligations.  
These statutes epitomize the legal language that Mellinkoff argued is 
“divorced from the common speech.”191 
Second, even statutes that act directly on individuals without an 
official interpretive role, including statutes with criminal penalties, are 
often addressed primarily or exclusively to subject-matter experts.  Most 
saliently, a number of commentators have argued that fair notice 
considerations are most acute in the context of criminal laws that act 
directly on individuals.192  But, it would be too facile to conclude that a 
statute has an audience of ordinary individuals rather than expert 
interpreters simply because it carries criminal penalties.  The FDCA, for 
example, provides criminal penalties193 for the commission of a long list of 
prohibited acts, including the adulteration and misbranding of food, drugs, 
cosmetics, tobacco products, and medical devices.194  But, even though it 
prescribes criminal penalties for its violation, the FDCA is addressed 
primarily to officials of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), which is 
vested with broad authority to promulgate regulations under the statute.195  
Perhaps most importantly, the FDA is authorized to define, and does 
define, important statutory terms, including determining what counts as 
misbranding196 or adulteration.197  Even to the extent that the audience of 
the FDCA includes individuals outside of the FDA, these individuals are, 
 
 187  Id. at 381. 
 188  43 U.S.C. § 1703 (2018) (imposing obligations on agency). 
 189  Id. § 1711 (imposing obligations on agency).  
 190  Id. § 1740 (setting out rulemaking obligations). 
 191  MELLINKOFF, supra note 129, at 18. 
 192  Gries & Slocum, supra note 9, at 1427. 
 193  21 U.S.C. § 333 (2018). 
 194  Id. § 331. 
 195  Id. § 371. 
 196  E.g., 21 C.F.R. § 201.1(a) (2019).  
 197  E.g., 21 C.F.R. § 106.1(a). 
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like government regulators, experts in the statutory subject-matter rather 
than hypothetical reasonable people.  This group includes lawyers, 
lobbyists, technical experts, scientists, and compliance officers employed 
by the small cohort of companies that are members of the pharmaceutical 
industry.198  And the language used in the FDCA, like the language used in 
most statutes, reflects the fact that its primary if not exclusive audience is 
an audience of experts knowledgeable about the subject matter regulated by 
the statute. 
Third, even if a statute can be said to be directed to nonexpert 
individuals—a situation most likely in the context of a simple rather than a 
complex statute—its audience is never limited to these ordinary 
individuals.199  Consider one of the simplest federal statutes, reproduced 
below in full: 
Whoever falsely represents himself to be an officer, agent, or 
employee of the United States, and in such assumed character 
arrests or detains any person or in any manner searches the 
person, buildings, or property of any person, shall be fined under 
this title or imprisoned not more than three years, or both.200 
Because the conduct proscribed is intuitively wrong, and because it is 
concisely written, perhaps this statute can fairly be characterized as having 
an audience that includes ordinary people without specialized training.  
Nevertheless, it would misunderstand the way the law is enforced to 
conclude that its audience is limited to nonexperts.  The audience of this 
impersonation statute also includes: federal agents charged with enforcing 
the law, lawyers in the United States Attorney’s Office who will decide 
whether to prosecute an accused offender, the accused’s counsel, and the 
judge who will oversee the ensuing trial.  All of these actors will interpret 
the statutory language in light of their background knowledge and 
professional obligations.  All of these experts will have at least some 
specialized knowledge, which a person without special training lacks, about 
the contours of what is prohibited; for example, the boundaries of what 
constitutes an “arrest” or a “search” are notoriously technical.201  Moreover, 
the judges and lawyers interpreting this statute will be constrained to 
interpret this language in accordance with professional standards and 
 
 198  Ross, supra note 154, at 1061–62. 
 199  MELLINKOFF, supra note 129, at 17–18; William N. Eskridge & Judith N. Levi, 
Regulatory Variables and Statutory Interpretation, 73 WASH. U. L. Q. 1103, 1010–11 
(1995); Victoria F. Nourse, Misunderstanding Congress: Statutory Interpretation, the 
Supermajoritarian Difficulty, and the Separation of Powers, 99 GEO. L.J. 1119, 1142 
(2011); Mattila, supra note 129, at 31. 
 200  18 U.S.C. § 913 (2018). 
 201  Schauer, supra note 131, at 7–8 (noting that words like search and seizure have legal 
meanings that are both over- and under-inclusive of their ordinary meaning).  
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ethical obligations that bind lawyers and judges.  Finally, these expert 
interpreters will need some knowledge of the broader legal regime in order 
to cross-reference this statute with other statutes to learn what fine might be 
applicable.  Similarly, all statutes that are addressed to individuals 
untrained in the law are also addressed to those with legal or subject-matter 
training who will interpret the statute in light of their expertise and 
professional obligations.202 
ii. Nonexpert Audiences Do Not Understand Legal Language 
Perhaps the best evidence that statutory language has a different 
audience than the type of language found in a general corpus is the 
enduring difficulty that writers and speakers of legal language encounter 
when attempting to communicate with those not versed in the law.203  Legal 
language, including statutory language, has long been criticized as being 
unintelligible to those untrained in the law.  It has been called “elitist, 
bloated, and filled with gobbledygook” and “too dense and clouded for 
laypersons to understand.”204  Even undoubtedly sophisticated readers like 
Swift, Dickens, Jefferson, and Bentham all have criticized legal language 
as unintelligible.205 
The unintelligibility of legal English is not a new phenomenon—for 
peculiar historical reasons, there has “never been a time since the Norman 
Conquest when the English of the law has been in tune with the common 
usage.  It has always been considered a language apart.”206  But, although 
the reasons for the distinctiveness of legal English are ancient, “the gap 
between legal discourse and everyday discourse is still very wide.  Present 
day legal discourse retains its identity as a highly specialised and 
distinctive discourse type or genre of English.”207  Jurors, for example, do 
not understand jury instructions, even when they think that they do,208 
 
 202  MELLINKOFF, supra note 129, at 17–18 (discussing words that have special meanings 
to lawyers trained in the law); Marmor, supra note 154, at 437 (“[T]he legislature 
deliberately speaks with several voices.”).  Many of the arguments about audience can be 
made, perhaps with greater force, about interpretation of agency regulations.  Even more so 
than statutes, regulations are usually addressed to industry insiders, defining statutory 
language that is itself directed to agency and industry insiders, and which draw on complex 
statutory and regulatory history.  
 203  JOHN GIBBONS, LANGUAGE AND THE LAW 13 (John Gibbons ed., 1994); McGinnis & 
Rappaport, supra note 18, at 1338–39. 
 204  Soha Turfler, Language Ideology and the Plain Language Movement: How Straight-
Talkers Sell Linguistic Myths, 12 LEGAL COMM. & RHETORIC 195, 196 (2015).  
 205  Williams, supra note 175, at 116. 
 206  GIBBONS, supra note 203, at 11–12.  See also Williams, supra note 175, at 116. 
 207  GIBBONS, supra note 203, at 13. 
 208  Bradley Saxton, How Well Do Jurors Understand Jury Instructions? A Field Test 
Using Real Juries and Real Trials in Wyoming, 33 LAND & WATER L. REV. 59, 67 (1998) 
(collecting and describing studies about jury comprehension); Walter W. Steele Jr. & 
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because jury instructions use “legal phrases and concepts that are foreign to 
the layperson.”209  Translators have found that translating legal texts is 
unlike translating nonlegal language.  Because legal language is “complex 
and highly technical,” “legal translation is generally recognized as the most 
complex and demanding of all areas of specialized translation.”210  As a 
consequence, it is not sufficient for legal translators to have language 
proficiency; they also must have “considerable specialist knowledge of 
both the source and target legal systems.”211  And the persistent 
unintelligibility of legal language to nonlawyers has given birth to “plain 
language” movements, both in the United States and abroad, which are 
dedicated to making legal language accessible to nonlegal audiences.212  
Despite some successes in the area of consumer contracts and agency 
guidance materials,213 however, these efforts have not had an impact on 
legislative drafting in the United States.214 
Of all legal language, statutory language has been called the most 
complex and esoteric, rendering it “incomprehensible to all except the 
specialist reader.”215  The influential Renton Committee, convened by the 
British Parliament to study statutory language, concluded that statutory 
language was impenetrable to ordinary citizens and might “as well be 
written in a foreign language.”216  Finally, and most tellingly, government 
entities themselves have acknowledged that they cannot communicate 
 
Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Jury Instructions: A Persistent Failure to Communicate, 67 N.C. L. 
REV. 77, 81 (1988). 
 209  Nancy Marder, Instructing the Jury, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LANGUAGE AND 
LAW, supra note 6, at 435, 439–40. 
 210  Susan Šarčević, Challenges to the Legal Translator, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
LANGUAGE AND LAW, supra note 6, at 187, 189. 
 211  Id.  Similarly, as McGinnis and Rappaport have suggested, nonlawyers recognize 
when they are reading legal language and defer to expert opinions, that is, lawyers, about it.  
McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 154, at 765. 
 212  Mark Adler, The Plain Language Movement, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
LANGUAGE AND LAW, supra note 6, at 67, 82–83.  Congress also acknowledged the need for 
a “plain language” movement when it enacted the Plain Writing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 
111-274, 124 Stat. 2861 (2010) (requiring agencies to issue documents in plain language). 
 213  Plain Writing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111–274, 124 Stat. 2861 (2010).  The Plain 
Writing Act requires agencies to write plainly and report back to Congress with the results 
of their efforts to do so.  It also requires the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to 
provide guidance to agencies to fulfill their statutory obligations.  OMB directed agencies to 
a set of guidelines created by an organization called PLAIN, which provides guidance on 
writing for the intended audience and avoiding unnecessarily complicated language or legal, 
foreign, or technical jargon.  See, e.g., Rachel Stabler, What We’ve Got Here Is a Failure to 
Communicate: The Plain Writing Act of 2010, 40 J. LEGIS. 280, 294–95 (2014). 
 214  See Williams, supra note 175, at 117–19. 
 215  GIBBONS, supra note 203, at 25. 
 216  DAVID RENTON, PARLIAMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM, THE PREPARATION OF 
LEGISLATION: REPORT OF A COMMITTEE APPOINTED BY THE LORD PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL 
37 (1975). 
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statutory obligations effectively to their citizens through statutory language.  
Instead, it is common for government entities to provide the public with 
summaries of statutes or regulations as a means of educating them about 
the law’s requirements.217  These publications summarize statutory 
language in narrative form or as bullet points or FAQs, provide rough 
definitions of legal terms, give examples to explain the intended meaning 
of statutory language, and even demonstrate statutory meaning with charts 
or pictures.218  To take just one example that includes many of these 
features, the United States Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
publishes a workers’ rights pamphlet directed to nonlegal audiences, 
including summaries of statutes, rough definitions, examples, and narrative 
language, all intended to provide guidance in nonlegal language.219 
3. Statutes Have Different Linguistic Characteristics than the 
Texts of a General Corpus 
Because the purpose and audience of statutory language are different 
than that of language found in the texts of a general corpus, it is not 
surprising that statutory language has different linguistic characteristics 
than nonlegal language.220  First, legal texts use words in unordinary ways.  
They contain “word usages that have no parallel in ordinary 
conversation,”221 like interplead and demurrer.  Legal language also 
preserves words and constructions that were once common in nonlegal 
speech but that are no longer current,222 like therefor, whereas, and “comes 
now the plaintiff.”  Moreover, legal English contains frequent traces of 
 
 217  A special thanks to Larry Solan for suggesting this line of inquiry.  
 218  See Nicholas R. Parrillo, Federal Agency Guidance and the Power to Bind: An 
Empirical Study of Agencies and Industries, 36 YALE J. ON REG. 165, 167 (2018) 
(“Guidance comes in an endless variety of labels and formats, depending on the agency: 
advisories, circulars, bulletins, memos, interpretive letters, enforcement manuals, fact 
sheets, FAQs, highlights, you name it.”). 
 219  U.S. DEP’T LAB. OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMIN., WORKERS’ RIGHTS 
OSHA 3021-06R (2017), https://www.osha.gov/Publications/osha3021.pdf.  See also MICH. 
LEGISLATURE, A PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR TENANTS & LANDLORDS (2017), https://www.legisla 
ture.mi.gov/Publications/tenantlandlord.pdf (providing a plain language “practical guide” 
for tenants and landlords designed to “inform tenants and landlords about their rights and 
responsibilities in rental relationships”). 
 220  In more technical language, linguists might describe the different genres, registers, or 
domains that these different types of text occupy.  David Y. W. Lee, Genres, Registers, Text 
Types, Domains, and Styles: Clarifying the Concepts and Navigating a Path Through the 
BNC Jungle, 5 LANGUAGE, LEARNING, AND TECH. 37, 37–41 (2001).  See Tiersma, supra 
note 153, at 27–28 (noting that law is replete with technical vocabulary, archaic, formal and 
unusual terminology, and unusual grammatical constructions).  See also Williams, supra 
note 175, at 112–13 (noting presence in legal language of foreign words and phrases). 
 221  McGreal, supra note 46, at 326.  See also Tiersma, supra note 153, at 27–28. 
 222  MELLINKOFF, supra note 129, at 12–13; Mattila, supra note 128, at 32. 
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Latin and law French,223 like fee simple and ab initio.  Harder to spot, but 
no more intelligible than these foreign or archaic words, is legal language’s 
frequent use of specialized terms and legal jargon,224 like “four corners of 
the complaint,” “lower court,” and “damages.” 
Most commonly, and most relevant to the purposes of this Article, 
legal language uses common terms, but gives them meanings different 
from, and sometimes even at odds with, the same words as used in nonlegal 
speech.225  As Mellinkoff described, legal language is characterized by the 
“frequent use of common words with uncommon meanings,”226 like claim 
and discovery.  It is this kind of language that creates the greatest risk of 
confusion when nonlawyers interact with the legal system.  Whether words 
like “seizure,”227 “reckless,”228 “utter,”229 and “consideration”230 are used in 
a legal sense or nonlegal sense makes all the difference to whether one’s 
rights have been violated or whether one is liable for punitive damages, has 
committed a crime, or has enforceable contract rights. 
The differences between legal language and nonlegal language are 
more than just differences in vocabulary.  Indeed, it is the differences in 
syntax and drafting conventions that “render[s] legislative texts 
incomprehensible to all except the specialist reader . . . .”231  Legal 
language is more complex232 and reflects a different “structure and 
arrangement of principal sentence elements” than nonlegal language.233  
Sentence length234 and clause structure235 also differ between legal and 
nonlegal language.  Moreover, legal language uses polysemes (words or 
 
 223  MELLINKOFF, supra note 129, at 13–15. 
 224  Id. at 17–19. 
 225  Schauer, supra note 154, at 35-36 (many “legal” words also have ordinary meanings 
that are different than legal meaning); Poscher, supra note 131, at 132; Mattila, supra note 
129, at 31 (“the use of ordinary words in a technical legal sense is particularly widespread”); 
Schauer, supra note 131, at 7–8 (words like search and seizure have legal meanings that are 
both over and under-inclusive of their ordinary meaning). 
 226  MELLINKOFF, supra note 129, at 11–12. 
 227  See 5 U.S.C. § 5545(a)(2)(A) (2018) (setting out obligation of federal officer to 
possess knowledge of “court decisions concerning . . . search and seizure”). 
 228  See 30 U.S.C. § 1235(l) (2018) (defining gross negligence to include “reckless” 
behavior). 
 229  See 18 U.S.C. § 331 (2018) (imposing criminal liability for a person who “utters” an 
altered, defaced, or mutilated coin). 
 230  See 31 U.S.C. § 3727(d) (2018) (providing circumstances under which a contract 
may be changed without “consideration”). 
 231  GIBBONS, supra note 203, at 25. 
 232  Gotti, supra note 159, at 53. 
 233  Risto Hiltunen, The Grammar and Structure of Legal Texts, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF LANGUAGE AND LAW, supra note 6, at 39, 41. 
 234  Hiltunen, supra note 233, at 42; Gotti, supra note 159, at 53–54. 
 235  Hiltunen, supra note 233, at 43; Gotti, supra note 159, at 53. 
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phrases with different, but related senses) with greater frequency than 
nonlegal language.236  At times, legal language can be unusually precise,237 
painstakingly including contextual knowledge that would be assumed in 
nonlegal speech.238  Other times, legal language is unusually vague,239 
perhaps because legislators seek agreement on language even when they 
cannot agree on its meaning.240  It is these variations from nonlegal syntax 
that serve “to distinguish the language of the law from the common 
tongue.”241 
Nonlegal language also has different drafting conventions than legal 
language.  For example, as Tiersma described, nonlegal English often 
replaces a repeated noun with a pronoun; writers of legal language, by 
contrast, tend to repeat the noun.  For example, it is common in legal 
English to write “Buyer promises that Buyer will pay,” when one means 
that the same person is doing the promising and buying.  By contrast, if a 
nonlegal English speaker writes “‘John kissed John’s girlfriend,’ we 
normally assume that there are two distinct people named John.”242  
Statutory language also abides by the convention of placing multiple 
related thoughts in the same sentence.  This convention results in sentences 
that can run hundreds of words and is responsible for the tightly-packed 
character of statutory language.243 
Third, although many of the above-described differences in word 
choice and syntax apply equally to statutory and non-statutory legal 
language, statutory language is especially different from the kind of 
language found in a general corpus.  One reason is that the texts of a 
general corpus include transcripts of spoken language, which is 
fundamentally different from written language.  One-fifth of the COCA 
consists of “unscripted conversation from more than 150 different TV and 
radio programs.”244  But, there are “fundamental differences between the 
interpretation of verbal utterances and texts.”245  Among other differences, 
oral interlocutors share time and space, creating a great deal of shared 
context that does not appear in the words themselves.246  For this reason, 
 
 236  Mattila, supra note 129, at 30. 
 237  MELLINKOFF, supra note 129, at 21–22.  
 238  Marmor, supra note 154, at 425; Allott & Shaer, supra note 167, at 115–16. 
 239  Poscher, supra note 131, at 134. 
 240  William N. Eskridge, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479, 
1532 (1986–87); Nourse & Schachter, supra note 170, at 595–96. 
 241  MELLINKOFF, supra note 128, at 23. 
 242  Tiersma, supra note 153, at 30. 
 243  GIBBONS, supra note 203, at 25. 
 244  CORPUS CONTEMPORARY AM. ENG., supra note 30. 
 245  SLOCUM, supra note 90, at 43. 
 246  SLOCUM, supra note 90, at 43–50. 
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Professor Brian Slocum notes that “ordinary conversations are a poor 
model for the interpretation of legal texts because the context of 
interpretation of oral statements differs so greatly from the context of 
interpretation of legal texts.”247 
In addition, statutory language is special, even when compared with 
other legal language.  As Tiersma notes, statutory language has “its own 
relatively rigid format and sometimes requires specific forms of 
language.”248  As a result, even when concluding that legal English as a 
whole is not a distinct language from nonlegal English, Tiersma notes that 
the two are most similar when nonlegal English is rendered in highly 
formal, written prose.  The formality of some nonlegal English, however, 
stands in sharp contrast with even the written texts of a general corpus.  
The COCA, for example, includes not only spoken language, but informal 
written speech, like the text of children’s magazines.249  The NOW Corpus 
contains not only news sources, but also online magazines with subjects as 
diverse as video games, cricket, and fashion from speech communities 
markedly different from the United States.250  And the COHA includes, 
among other texts, movie scripts and poetry.251  Because a general corpus 
includes spoken and informal written language, and because of the special 
nature of statutes, whatever similarities there are between legal English and 
nonlegal English more generally, statutory language and the language of 
the texts of a general corpus are considerably less similar. 
4. A General Corpus Should Not Be Used to Interpret Statutory 
Language 
It is never appropriate to search for statutory meaning in a general 
corpus.  As described above, statutory language and the language found in 
a general corpus differ in purpose, audience, and linguistic characteristics.  
In other words, statutory language and the texts of a general corpus do not 
share the same context.  As a result, an interpretation of a statute according 
to the meaning of language in a general corpus is lacking the statutory 
context that is necessary to understand statutory meaning.  An 
interpretation of a statute without statutory context, in other words, fails to 
reflect the meaning attributable to the fact that a statute is statutory 
language as opposed to a novel, poem, or some other nonstatutory text.252  
 
 247  SLOCUM, supra note 90, at 14; see also Tiersma, supra note 153, at 27; Allott & 
Shaer, supra note 167, at 115–16; Gillian Brown, Understanding Spoken Language, 12 
TESOL Q. 271 (1994). 
 248  Tiersma, supra note 153, at 30. 
 249  CORPUS CONTEMPORARY AM. ENG., supra note 30.  
 250  NOW CORPUS (NEWS ON THE WEB), supra note 115. 
 251  CORPUS HISTORICAL AM. ENG., supra note 115. 
 252  For a contrary view, see Brian G. Slocum, Pragmatics and Legal Texts: How Best to 
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Moreover, the differences between statutory language and nonlegal 
language are pervasive rather than exceptional.  That is, the differences 
described above suggest that statutory language is something other than 
nonlegal language sprinkled with occasional legal terms of art.  Instead, it 
makes more sense to think of statutes as written in a different dialect or 
sublanguage—statutory language—albeit one that contains both words that 
differ obviously from their use in nonlegal language and also words that 
mean the same thing as their cognates in nonlegal language.253 
Consider the following non-statutory text: 
(1) When I lived in London, I rented a flat overlooking the 
Thames. 
Here, the word “flat” is used differently than Americans would use that 
word.  When reading (1), an American reader would simply substitute the 
word “apartment” for “flat” and read the rest of the sentence without much 
effort.  Nevertheless, it does not follow that the sentence is written in 
American English with one word, flat, written in British English.  Instead, 
depending on the context of the utterance (including the purpose, audience, 
and surrounding texts), it might make more sense to conclude that the 
whole sentence is written in British English, a separate dialect with many 
cognates in American English.  Similarly, it would be a mistake to read a 
statute and conclude, because much of it can be read with little effort, that 
it is written in nonlegal language except for the few words that appear to be 
legal terms of art.254  Better, for all the reasons described above, statutory 
text should be considered a dialect of natural language (or a “sublanguage,” 
as Tiersma put it),255 statutory language, whose meaning cannot be 
determined simply by importing the meaning of its words from nonlegal 
 
Account for the Gap Between Literal Meaning and Communicative Meaning, in THE 
PRAGMATIC TURN IN LAW: INFERENCE AND INTERPRETATION IN LEGAL DISCOURSE 140 (Janet 
Giltrow & Dieter Stein eds., 2017) (disagreeing with the proposition that “the draftors of 
legal texts, particularly statutes, do not use language in the same ways as do others, and that 
these differences preclude the applicability of conversational implicatures.”).  See also 
Fallon, supra note 151, at 331–33 (arguing that legal language is not a language in the same 
sense as natural language); Summers, supra note 45, at 234 (arguing that interpreting 
statutory language does not require a person to “leave the world of ordinary language and 
enter a specialized legal world governed by some special tongue”).  
 253  Schauer, supra note 131, at 19–20.  See also McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 18, 
at 1377 (arguing that the structure of a document, not simply its words, determine whether it 
is written in technical or ordinary language). 
 254  Tiersma, supra note 153, at 29 (it “would be the wrong lesson to draw” that “legal 
language is nothing more than ordinary English with a lot of specialized vocabulary”). 
 255  Tiersma, supra note 153, at 31. Cf. Fallon, supra note 151, at 331–32.  Fallon argues, 
quite reasonably, that legal language is not independent of natural language and does not 
share its status as an independent language.  But, simply because legal English differs from 
spoken English less than, say, French, it does not follow that legal English is similar to 
spoken English in a way that is relevant to statutory interpretation. 
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texts.  Instead, a statute should be read as statutory language, with all of the 
distinctive features of this language, including its unique purposes, 
audience, word choice, syntax, and other conventions.256 
Interpreted in this manner, the meaning of statutory language is 
always a distinctively legal meaning.  In some cases, giving the words in a 
statute their legal meaning yields the same interpretation as giving its 
words their nonlegal meaning; in other cases, recognizing the 
distinctiveness of statutory language leads to a different interpretation.  
Either way, a reader who interprets statutory language as something distinct 
from nonlegal language recognizes that the project of interpreting legal 
language is not just one of translating individual technical words and 
phrases and inserting them into an otherwise nonlegal text.  By contrast, 
when users of corpus linguistics techniques search for statutory meaning in 
general corpora, they risk missing the meaning that is attributable to the 
statutory context.  As a result, corpus users, in a real sense, misconstrue the 
language of the text they interpret.257  Because it is an error to interpret 
even nontechnical statutory language according to its nonlegal meaning, it 
is never appropriate to search in a general corpus for statutory meaning. 
The distinction between nonlegal meaning and statutory meaning 
leads to one final point: it is possible to reject the claim that statutory 
language should be interpreted according to its nonlegal meaning and still 
accept the claim that statutory language should be interpreted according to 
its ordinary meaning, properly understood.258  This is true because ordinary 
meaning is not synonymous with nonlegal meaning.  As Professor David 
Strauss has noted, the ordinary meaning of statutory language “is not so 
ordinary.”  Rather, it is better thought of as “ordinary legal meaning,” as 
distinguished from ordinary (nonlegal) meaning.259  Consider, for example, 
a prohibition on “uttering” in a statute concerning securities fraud.  The 
ordinary meaning of a prohibition on “uttering” in a statute about securities 
 
 256  Schauer, supra note 131, at 19–20.  See also Fiss, supra note 4, at 744 (arguing that 
an interpreter is constrained by “a set of rules that specify the relevance and weight to be 
assigned to the material”). 
 257  To be clear, I am not suggesting that statutory language is a literally a distinct 
language from ordinary English.  As Schauer sensibly noted, “[l]egal English is related to 
ordinary English in ways that Estonian is not.”  Schauer, supra note 154, at 36.  But, the 
differences are clear enough to justify Tiersma’s judgment that legal language is a 
“sublanguage” of English, falling “somewhere between a separate language and ordinary 
English.”  Tiersma, supra note 153, at 31. 
 258  Frederick Schauer, Statutory Construction and the Coordinating Function of Plain 
Meaning, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 234, 234 n.6 (noting that it is “implausible” that plain 
meaning “must necessarily be the same as ordinary non-technical meaning”). 
 259  Strauss, supra note 154 at 1568.  Cf. SLOCUM, supra note 90, at 12–13, 179–80 
(distinguishing ordinary legal meaning from ordinary meaning). 
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fraud includes passing off a worthless check as genuine,260 including 
handing a counterfeit check to a bank cashier.261  By contrast, an 
interpretation of the term “utter” according to its nonlegal meaning (that is, 
the meaning found in a general corpus), would attribute to it a meaning 
involving making a sound with one’s voice or perhaps a meaning involving 
completeness or totality.262  As this example demonstrates, the ordinary 
meaning of a statutory term can differ from its nonlegal meaning.  Because 
nonlegal meaning is not coextensive with ordinary meaning, rejecting the 
use of corpus linguistics for statutory interpretation does not entail rejecting 
the common preference for interpreting texts according to their ordinary 
meaning.263 
This section has described the subjective and nontrivial choice that a 
user of corpus linguistics techniques makes when choosing a corpus to 
search for statutory meaning.  The choice is subjective because corpus 
users do not adhere to standards for choosing a corpus and perhaps cannot 
articulate a persuasive test distinguishing between ordinary terms and legal 
terms of art.  Moreover, and perhaps more importantly, it is never 
appropriate for a user of corpus linguistics for statutory interpretation to 
rely on a general corpus.  Because legal language is different than nonlegal 
language—in purpose, audience, word choice, syntax, and drafting 
conventions—the meaning of statutory language is not the same, in a 
relevant way, as the meaning of cognate words found in a general corpus. 
C. Is a “Legal Corpus” the Answer? 
Because the use of corpus linguistics techniques for statutory 
interpretation has focused, virtually exclusively, on searches in general 
corpora, the mismatch between statutory language and nonlegal language is 
the most pressing theoretical problem facing courts and commentators 
relying on corpus techniques to interpret statutes.  In response to these 
problems, one might suggest that a “legal corpus” could be constructed—
that is—a corpus populated by legal texts rather than nonlegal texts.264  
 
 260  18 U.S.C. § 513 (2018) (penalizing a person who “utters or possesses a counterfeited 
security . . . [or who] makes, utters or possesses a forged security . . . with intent to deceive 
another person”).  United States v. Peters, 462 F.3d 953, 959 (8th Cir. 2003) (upholding 
conviction for “uttering” where defendant “deposited, and substantially spent, a check that 
he knew was counterfeit into his bank account”). 
 261  Peters, 462 F.3d at 953. 
 262  A search for “utter” in the COCA, for example, returns many hits that reflect these 
nonlegal meanings.  CORPUS CONTEMPORARY AM. ENG., supra note 30 (search for “utter”). 
 263  E.g., Eskridge, supra note 43, at 538–39. 
 264  Phillips, Ortner & Lee, supra note 8, at 24.  See also Solan, supra note 42, at 59–60 
(noting that searching a corpus designed to reflect ordinary meaning is not very useful for 
determining the meaning of terms of art).  Cf. Heilpern, supra note 128, at 380 (suggesting 
that technical terms of art—but not legal terms of art—should be interpreted according to 
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Even if it is inappropriate to interpret statutes according to their nonlegal 
meaning, the argument might go, this is not a problem with corpus 
linguistics techniques per se, but rather with the choice of corpus.  A corpus 
user, therefore, could search a legal corpus to interpret statutory language, 
eliminating the problems associated with nonlegal language.  Even on its 
face, however, this response is inadequate to eliminate the subjectivity 
inherent in corpus use.  Because legal terms cannot be separated neatly 
from nonlegal terms in the same text, the “difference between legal terms 
and words of ordinary language is relative and hard to define.”265  As a 
result, a corpus user would have no objective way to choose between a 
legal corpus and general corpus for many statutory terms.  The construction 
of a legal corpus, therefore, would not eliminate the subjectivity of the 
choice of corpus. 
Even assuming that there is a way to distinguish legal words from 
nonlegal words sufficient to meet this objection, there are a number of 
other reasons why a search in a legal corpus cannot help uncover 
interpretations of statutory language objectively.  First, even if a corpus 
user determined that a statutory term should be given its legal meaning, 
words used in statutory language often have more than one legal meaning.  
A “claim” means something wholly different in the context of patent 
law,266 civil procedure,267 and government contracts.268  And “discharge” of 
a firearm269 is not the same as the “discharge” of a pollutant270 or discharge 
 
meaning found in technical documents). 
 265  Mattila, supra note 129, at 31.  See also TIERSMA, supra note 129, at 108 (the 
distinction between terms of art and legal jargon “is mainly one of degree”); MELLINKOFF, 
supra note 129, at 17. 
 266  Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 373–74 (1996) 
(“[A] patent includes one or more claims, which particularly poin[t] out and distinctly 
clai[m] the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention.  A claim covers and 
secures a process, a machine, a manufacture, a composition of matter, or a design, but never 
the function or result of either, nor the scientific explanation of their operation.  
The claim define[s] the scope of a patent grant, and functions to forbid not only exact copies 
of an invention, but products that go to the heart of an invention but avoids the literal 
language of the claim by making a noncritical change.”) (internal citations and quotes 
omitted). 
 267  A claim is a set of facts for which the law provides redress, an innovation in civil 
procedure designed to avoid “the unfortunate rigidity and confusion surrounding the words 
cause of action.”  5 FED. PRAC. & PROC. CIV. § 1216 (3d ed.). 
 268  31 U.S.C. § 3729 (2018) (“[C]laim . . . means any request or demand, whether under 
a contract or otherwise, for money or property and whether or not the United States has title 
to the money or property, that is presented to an officer, employee, or agent of the United 
States.”). 
 269  State v. Rasabout, 356 P.3d 1258, 1261 (Utah 2015) (Lee, J., concurring) (“the 
allowable unit of prosecution for unlawful discharge of a firearm is each discrete shot”).  
 270  33 U.S.C. § 1362(12) (2018) (“discharge of a pollutant” means “any addition of any 
pollutant to navigable waters from any point source . . . .”). 
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from the hospital.271  Each of these terms has multiple distinct meanings; as 
a result, searching for the meaning of any of these terms in a legal corpus 
would provide no more precision than consulting a legal dictionary and do 
nothing to reduce the subjectivity of the choice.272  Take, for example, the 
use of the term “claim” in the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act 
(FERA).  FERA amended the False Claims Act (FCA), retroactively, to 
include “all claims under the False Claims Act” pending as of a given 
date.273  On one hand, the “claims” referred to in FERA might be the type 
of claims that are the subject of the FCA, that is, demands for money from 
the federal Treasury.274  On the other hand, FERA’s “claims” might refer to 
lawsuits by the government under the FCA, that is, the civil procedure 
meaning of the term.275  The difference between these two interpretations 
has real-world significance because each interpretation reaches a different 
set of cases.  Nevertheless, results returned by a search in a legal corpus 
would shed no light on which of these two distinct meanings is the meaning 
of “claims” in FERA. 
Second, a possible response to the problem of multiple legal meanings 
would be to construct multiple subject-matter-specific legal corpora.276  For 
example, if a lawyer was interpreting the term “discharge” in an 
environmental case, the argument might go, she could simply search an 
environmental law corpus rather than a criminal law corpus for the term.  
But, multiple subject-matter-specific corpora would not help a corpus user 
interpret a statute in an objective way.  This proposed solution presupposes 
that there are relatively firm legal categories, like “environmental law” and 
“criminal law”; but, of course, legal categories are not nearly as distinct as 
this proposed response suggests.  For example, “discharge” of a pollutant is 
an environmental crime.277  There is not, therefore, a firm line between 
hypothetical environmental and criminal corpora.  Similarly, there is not a 
 
 271  United States ex rel. Worthy v. E. Me. Healthcare Sys., No. 2:14-CV-00184-JAW, 
2017 WL 211609, at *8 (D. Me. 2017) (noting different types of hospital discharge statuses, 
each requiring different codes). 
 272  Moreover, both common law and civil law traditions have terms of art, but their 
drafting conventions, resulting from their different histories, are different.  Gotti, supra note 
159, at 58.  
 273  Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, Pub. L. 111-21, § 4(f), 123 Stat. 
1617, 1625 (2009) (emphasis added). 
 274  Matthew Titolo, Retroactivity and the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, 
86 IND. L.J. 258, 268–69 (2011). 
 275  Id.; Sanders v. Allison Engine Co., 703 F.3d 930, 937 (6th Cir. 2012). 
 276  Cf. Heilpern, supra note 128, at 380 (suggesting that technical terms of art—but not 
legal terms of art—should be interpreted according to meaning found in technical 
documents). 
 277  33 U.S.C. § 1311 (2018) (prohibiting discharge of effluent); id. § 1319 (providing 
criminal penalties for discharge of effluent). 
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firm line between other hypothetical subject-matter-specific legal corpora. 
Moreover, even if an interpreter were certain about which legal corpus 
to choose, a search in a subject-matter-specific legal corpus provides no 
way to choose among closely related legal meanings of words, all of which 
would be found in the same subject matter corpus.  Polysemes—words or 
phrases with different, but related senses—occur frequently in legal 
language.278  Because they are closely related, legal polysemes would be 
found in the same specialized legal corpus.  As a result, choosing a 
particular subject-matter-specific legal corpus would do nothing to help 
determine which of two related possible meanings is the meaning of a 
statutory term.  Consider, for example, the ubiquitous legal term 
“jurisdiction.”  It can refer to the particular physical territory where a body 
of law governs (like Congress’s exclusive jurisdiction over the District of 
Columbia),279 the power of the court to exercise authority over particular 
types of disputes (subject matter jurisdiction),280 the power of the court to 
exercise authority over a particular individual (personal jurisdiction),281 or 
the power of the court to hear a case in a particular procedural posture 
(original vs. appellate jurisdiction).282  Because these polysemes would all 
likely be in the same hypothetical subject-matter-specific corpus, the 
construction of subject-matter-specific corpora would not help an 
interpreter choose an interpretation objectively. 
V. SUBJECTIVITY AND CORPUS USAGE REVISITED 
Part IV identified the choice of corpus as a key point in the 
interpretive process at which corpus users must make a subjective choice.  
Because the stated goal of corpus users is to reduce subjectivity, 
recognizing the subjectivity of the use of corpus linguistics in statutory 
interpretation should give legal interpreters pause before they adopt corpus 
methods for an interpretive decision.  This Part will make the stronger 
claim that corpus use for statutory interpretation, as described above, is 
subjective in the same way as the interpretive methods that corpus users 
criticize.  This demonstration suggests that corpus methods do not add 
value to the interpretive process at all. 
Specifically, this Part will connect the types of subjectivity identified 
by proponents of corpus linguistics with the types of subjectivity that attach 
to corpus use itself.  As Part III showed, proponents of corpus linguistics 
techniques for statutory interpretation roundly criticize two main sources of 
 
 278  Mattila, supra note 129, at 30. 
 279  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17. 
 280  E.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2018). 
 281  E.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k). 
 282  U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.  
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subjectivity: reliance on the intuition of the interpreter and reliance on 
biased reference data.  In order to evaluate corpus users’ claim that corpus 
use is less subjective than other methods of interpretation, this Part will 
compare the subjectivity of corpus analysis with corpus users’ critiques of 
other methods of interpretation.  The comparison demonstrates that the 
subjectivity of the choice of corpus identified in Part IV is also rooted in 
the intuition of the interpreter and in reliance on biased reference data.  
This conclusion undercuts the claim that corpus linguistics is more 
objective than the methods of interpretation it critiques. 
A. Intuition and Corpus Linguistics 
A choice of corpus relies on an intuition about what kind of word is 
being interpreted—that is—whether the word is an ordinary term or, by 
contrast, a specialized legal term.  As noted, corpus users have not 
articulated, and likely cannot articulate, a persuasive account describing 
when a word is a legal term of art rather than an ordinary term.283  
Nevertheless, users of corpus techniques regularly conclude, without 
analysis, that terms like “results in,”284 “information,”285 and “harbor”286 are 
ordinary words rather than legal terms.  In the absence of an explanation, 
and given the lack of a pattern of use that would suggest the application of 
a standard,287 it appears that it is the interpreters’ intuition, rather than any 
theory or replicable data, that is being consulted to make this ordinariness 
determination. 
Moreover, even when corpus users acknowledge that some words are 
terms of art, they rely on their intuition to determine that a particular word 
is ordinary.  Consider again the Rasabout case, in which Justice Lee 
criticized the majority for relying on intuition to determine that the 
statutory term “discharge” roughly means “shoot.”288  Lee argued that the 
equation of discharge with shoot may be correct, but it is based on intuition 
rather than data.289  But, the same can be said for Lee’s determination that 
“discharge” is an ordinary term rather than a term of art.  Rather than 
offering a reason why discharge is an ordinary word, he gave only a reason 
for not considering the question.  Specifically, he noted that “no one has 
proffered the view that discharge is a legal term of art subject to 
 
 283  See Part IV.A. 
 284  Wilson v. Safelite Grp., Inc., 930 F.3d 429, 439, 440 (6th Cir. 2019) (Thapar, J., 
concurring). 
 285  People v. Harris, 885 N.W.2d 832, 839 n.33 (Mich. 2016). 
 286  Lee & Mouritsen, supra note 7, at 812. 
 287  In re Adoption of Baby E.Z., 266 P.3d 702, 724 (Utah 2011) (searching the COCA 
after identifying a word as a term of art). 
 288  State v. Rasabout, 356 P.3d 1258, 1274–75 (Utah 2015) (Lee, J., concurring).  
 289  Id. at 1274–75. 
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specialized meaning in the law.  Everyone agrees that this term is being 
used in its ordinary sense.”290  In other words, Lee relied on his own 
intuition (along with the intuition of the majority) to conclude that 
“discharge” was used in its ordinary sense.  But, aggregated intuitions, like 
anecdotes, are not data.  Lee’s intuition may be “correct” in the sense that it 
matched the unverified intuition of others, but it is no more rooted in 
objective data than the interpretation he criticized.291 
B. Biased Reference Data and Corpus Linguistics 
The choice of a general corpus for statutory interpretation entails the 
reliance on biased reference data.  A general corpus, as described above, is 
designed to represent nonspecialized speech by containing texts that use 
language in nonspecialized circumstances.292  The COCA’s 560 million 
words, for example, include transcriptions of spoken language, fiction, 
popular magazines, newspaper articles, and the like.293  The use of 
language in a general corpus is biased with respect to statutory language 
because it shares none of the same context—that is, purpose, audience, 
word choice, and syntax—as statutory language. 
To make this point clear, consider corpus users’ criticism of 
dictionary use for statutory interpretation.  Corpus users criticize dictionary 
use for statutory interpretation purposes because dictionaries lack the 
context of ordinary language.294  By providing definitions of words without 
accompanying context, they argue, dictionaries systematically underreport 
ordinary uses of words.  This flaw, corpus users suggest, biases dictionaries 
in favor of atypical usages, leaving even the good-faith interpreter unable 
to rely on dictionary usage without the risk of reaching atypical results.295 
But, if the dictionary’s disease is its lack of context, the corpus cure is 
 
 290  Id. at 1287. 
 291  Similarly, in the context of constitutional interpretation, Phillips, Ortner, and Lee 
assert that “corruption of blood” is a legal term of art while “commerce” is an ordinary 
word.  Phillips, Ortner & Lee, supra note 8, at 24.  Their only explanation for why 
“commerce” is an ordinary word is that “it makes no sense, and completely undermines the 
premise of ordinary public meaning, to argue that because a word or phrase is used in a legal 
document it automatically has a specialized legal sense.”  Id.  This explanation, even if true, 
indicates only that not every word in a legal document is a term of art.  It does not describe 
why commerce is ordinary, a conclusion that appears based on intuition rather than 
objective data.  See also Ilya Somin, Originalism and Political Ignorance, 97 MINN. L. REV. 
625, 651–52 (2012) (noting that terms like Bill of Attainder, privileges and immunities, and 
corruption of blood are terms of art, but words like liberty, property, and commerce are 
ordinary words). 
 292  Gries & Slocum, supra note 9, at 1441; Lee & Mouritsen, supra note 7, at 828–29. 
 293  CORPUS CONTEMPORARY AM. ENG., supra note 30. 
 294  Gries & Slocum, supra note 9, at 1441. 
 295  See, e.g., Craig v. Provo, 389 P.3d 423, 428 n.3. 
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worse.  By relying on words in a general corpus, a corpus user will 
interpret statutory language as if it were used in the same types of contexts 
as spoken language, newspaper articles, poetry, screen plays, magazines, 
and the like.  Because statutory language is written and read for different 
purposes, reflects different audiences, and has different linguistic 
characteristics than nonlegal language, interpreting statutory language by 
reference to the use of words in nonlegal language does not place statutory 
language in context.  Rather, corpus use is radically acontextual, divorcing 
statutory language from its distinctly legal context and guaranteeing 
interpretations that do not reflect the unique characteristics of statutory 
language.296 
Indeed, the radical acontextuality that comes from interpreting 
statutory language as nonlegal language has been expressly embraced by 
corpus users.  In his Rasabout dissent, Justice Lee considered, and rejected, 
the suggestion that statutory language should be interpreted in the context 
of other statutory language.  The Rasabout majority criticized Lee’s use of 
a corpus containing no statutory text for excluding the “the only speaker 
that matters,” that is, the legislature.297  Lee responded that the text of the 
Utah Code was not an appropriate corpus for determining the meaning of a 
term in the Utah Code.298  Lee’s response suggests that the acontextuality 
of searching a general corpus for statutory language is purposeful rather 
than an oversight. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The dream of objectivity has driven the adoption of corpus linguistics 
techniques by commentators and a growing number of judges.  The timing 
of this move is not surprising.  One reason is obvious: technological 
advances have made corpus linguistics methods accessible to legal 
interpreters without specialized linguistics training.  But, there is another 
reason why courts and commentators have been quick to adopt this new 
methodology.  The American legal profession, by many accounts, is 
turning self-consciously toward formalism.  As legal interpreters seek to 
 
 296  For more on context, corpus linguistics, and ordinary meaning, see Slocum, supra 
note 17, at 13.  What should be most alarming to interpreters considering a general corpus 
for statutory interpretation is the fact that it might contain language outside the context of 
American English altogether.  The NOW Corpus, for example, contains texts that come not 
only from United States, but from markedly different linguistic communities, like India, 
Nigeria, Singapore, Kenya, Pakistan, and the Philippines, among others.  Although a corpus 
user can exclude this data from a search, a default search in the NOW Corpus contains 
language from these countries.  Interpreting statutes by relying on corpus data that includes 
English words used in foreign countries gives rise to significant democratic accountability 
problems. 
 297  State v. Rasabout, 356 P.3d 1258, 1266 (Utah 2015). 
 298  Id. at 1287 (Lee, J., concurring).  
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minimize their role—or the appearance of their role—in the interpretive 
process, the search for an objective tool of interpretation becomes more 
attractive.  Seen in this light, the problem with corpus linguistics techniques 
is not their subjectivity, which may well be an inevitable part of the 
interpretive process, but the erroneous claim that they are superior because 
of their objectivity.  Corpus linguistics will continue to be appealing to 
legal interpreters seeking to demonstrate their self-restraint; but its 
proponents should take care not to dismiss traditional methods of statutory 
interpretation, with all their warts, to chase a merely evanescent dream of 
objectivity. 
 
